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This is the 5.2.59 stable release
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commit a9f675f950a07d5c1dbcbb97aabac56f5ed085e3 upstream.
The code in vdso_cpu_init that exposes the cpu and numa node to
userspace via SPRG_VDSO incorrctly masks the cpu to 12 bits. This means
that any kernel running on a box with more than 4096 threads (NR_CPUS
advertises a limit of of 8192 cpus) would expose userspace to two cpu
contexts running at the same time with the same cpu number.
Note: I'm not aware of any distro shipping a kernel with support for more
than 4096 threads today, nor of any system image that currently exceeds
4096 threads. Found via code browsing.
Fixes: 18ad51dd342a7eb09dbcd059d0b451b616d4dafc ("powerpc: Add VDSO version of getcpu")
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <miltonm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200715233704.1352257-1-anton@ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ec2fc2a9e9bbad9023aab65bc472ce7a3ca8608f upstream.
Partition suspension, used for hibernation and migration, requires
that the OS place all but one of the LPAR's processor threads into one
of two states prior to calling the ibm,suspend-me RTAS function:
* the architected offline state (via RTAS stop-self); or
* the H_JOIN hcall, which does not return until the partition
resumes execution
Using H_CEDE as the offline mode, introduced by
commit 3aa565f53c39 ("powerpc/pseries: Add hooks to put the CPU into
an appropriate offline state"), means that any threads which are
offline from Linux's point of view must be moved to one of those two
states before a partition suspension can proceed.
This was eventually addressed in commit 120496ac2d2d ("powerpc: Bring
all threads online prior to migration/hibernation"), which added code
to temporarily bring up any offline processor threads so they can call
H_JOIN. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation has had
multiple races with cpu hotplug operations initiated from user
space[1][2][3], the error handling is fragile, and it generates
user-visible cpu hotplug events which is a lot of noise for a platform
feature that's supposed to minimize disruption to workloads.
With commit 3aa565f53c39 ("powerpc/pseries: Add hooks to put the CPU
into an appropriate offline state") reverted, this code becomes
unnecessary, so remove it. Since any offline CPUs now are truly
offline from the platform's point of view, it is no longer necessary
to bring up CPUs only to have them call H_JOIN and then go offline
again upon resuming. Only active threads are required to call H_JOIN;
stopped threads can be left alone.
[1] commit a6717c01ddc2 ("powerpc/rtas: use device model APIs and
serialization during LPM")
[2] commit 9fb603050ffd ("powerpc/rtas: retry when cpu offline races
with suspend/migration")
[3] commit dfd718a2ed1f ("powerpc/rtas: Fix a potential race between
CPU-Offline & Migration")
Fixes: 120496ac2d2d ("powerpc: Bring all threads online prior to migration/hibernation")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612051238.1007764-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
[PG: drop EXPORT_SYMBOL of removed fcns that existed in v5.2.x baseline.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.49 stable release
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commit 8a5054d8cbbe03c68dcb0957c291c942132e4101 upstream.
The architecture allows for machine check exceptions to cause idle
wakeups which resume at the 0x200 address which has to return via
the idle wakeup code, but the early machine check handler is run
first.
The case of a no state-loss sleep is broken because the early
handler uses non-volatile register r1 , which is needed for the wakeup
protocol, but it is not restored.
Fix this by loading r1 from the MCE exception frame before returning
to the idle wakeup code. Also update the comment which has become
stale since the idle rewrite in C.
This crash was found and fix confirmed with a machine check injection
test in qemu powernv model (which is not upstream in qemu yet).
Fixes: 10d91611f426d ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in C")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200508043408.886394-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7ffa8b7dc11752827329e4e84a574ea6aaf24716 upstream.
Aneesh increased the size of struct pt_regs by 16 bytes and started
seeing this WARN_ON:
smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c:455 giveup_all+0xb4/0x110
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-1.g8f6a41f-default+ #318
NIP: c00000000001a2b4 LR: c00000000001a29c CTR: c0000000031d0000
REGS: c0000000026d3980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.7.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-1.g8f6a41f-default+)
MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48048224 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c000000000019cc8 IRQMASK: 1
GPR00: c00000000001a264 c0000000026d3c20 c0000000026d7200 800000000280b033
GPR04: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000077 30206d7372203164
GPR08: 0000000000002000 0000000002002000 800000000280b033 3230303030303030
GPR12: 0000000000008800 c0000000031d0000 0000000000800050 0000000002000066
GPR16: 000000000309a1a0 000000000309a4b0 000000000309a2d8 000000000309a890
GPR20: 00000000030d0098 c00000000264da40 00000000fd620000 c0000000ff798080
GPR24: c00000000264edf0 c0000001007469f0 00000000fd620000 c0000000020e5e90
GPR28: c00000000264edf0 c00000000264d200 000000001db60000 c00000000264d200
NIP [c00000000001a2b4] giveup_all+0xb4/0x110
LR [c00000000001a29c] giveup_all+0x9c/0x110
Call Trace:
[c0000000026d3c20] [c00000000001a264] giveup_all+0x64/0x110 (unreliable)
[c0000000026d3c90] [c00000000001ae34] __switch_to+0x104/0x480
[c0000000026d3cf0] [c000000000e0b8a0] __schedule+0x320/0x970
[c0000000026d3dd0] [c000000000e0c518] schedule_idle+0x38/0x70
[c0000000026d3df0] [c00000000019c7c8] do_idle+0x248/0x3f0
[c0000000026d3e70] [c00000000019cbb8] cpu_startup_entry+0x38/0x40
[c0000000026d3ea0] [c000000000011bb0] rest_init+0xe0/0xf8
[c0000000026d3ed0] [c000000002004820] start_kernel+0x990/0x9e0
[c0000000026d3f90] [c00000000000c49c] start_here_common+0x1c/0x400
Which was unexpected. The warning is checking the thread.regs->msr
value of the task we are switching from:
usermsr = tsk->thread.regs->msr;
...
WARN_ON((usermsr & MSR_VSX) && !((usermsr & MSR_FP) && (usermsr & MSR_VEC)));
ie. if MSR_VSX is set then both of MSR_FP and MSR_VEC are also set.
Dumping tsk->thread.regs->msr we see that it's: 0x1db60000
Which is not a normal looking MSR, in fact the only valid bit is
MSR_VSX, all the other bits are reserved in the current definition of
the MSR.
We can see from the oops that it was swapper/0 that we were switching
from when we hit the warning, ie. init_task. So its thread.regs points
to the base (high addresses) in init_stack.
Dumping the content of init_task->thread.regs, with the members of
pt_regs annotated (the 16 bytes larger version), we see:
0000000000000000 c000000002780080 gpr[0] gpr[1]
0000000000000000 c000000002666008 gpr[2] gpr[3]
c0000000026d3ed0 0000000000000078 gpr[4] gpr[5]
c000000000011b68 c000000002780080 gpr[6] gpr[7]
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 gpr[8] gpr[9]
c0000000026d3f90 0000800000002200 gpr[10] gpr[11]
c000000002004820 c0000000026d7200 gpr[12] gpr[13]
000000001db60000 c0000000010aabe8 gpr[14] gpr[15]
c0000000010aabe8 c0000000010aabe8 gpr[16] gpr[17]
c00000000294d598 0000000000000000 gpr[18] gpr[19]
0000000000000000 0000000000001ff8 gpr[20] gpr[21]
0000000000000000 c00000000206d608 gpr[22] gpr[23]
c00000000278e0cc 0000000000000000 gpr[24] gpr[25]
000000002fff0000 c000000000000000 gpr[26] gpr[27]
0000000002000000 0000000000000028 gpr[28] gpr[29]
000000001db60000 0000000004750000 gpr[30] gpr[31]
0000000002000000 000000001db60000 nip msr
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 orig_r3 ctr
c00000000000c49c 0000000000000000 link xer
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ccr softe
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 trap dar
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 dsisr result
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ppr kuap
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 pad[2] pad[3]
This looks suspiciously like stack frames, not a pt_regs. If we look
closely we can see return addresses from the stack trace above,
c000000002004820 (start_kernel) and c00000000000c49c (start_here_common).
init_task->thread.regs is setup at build time in processor.h:
#define INIT_THREAD { \
.ksp = INIT_SP, \
.regs = (struct pt_regs *)INIT_SP - 1, /* XXX bogus, I think */ \
The early boot code where we setup the initial stack is:
LOAD_REG_ADDR(r3,init_thread_union)
/* set up a stack pointer */
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r1,THREAD_SIZE)
add r1,r3,r1
li r0,0
stdu r0,-STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD(r1)
Which creates a stack frame of size 112 bytes (STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD).
Which is far too small to contain a pt_regs.
So the result is init_task->thread.regs is pointing at some stack
frames on the init stack, not at a pt_regs.
We have gotten away with this for so long because with pt_regs at its
current size the MSR happens to point into the first frame, at a
location that is not written to by the early asm. With the 16 byte
expansion the MSR falls into the second frame, which is used by the
compiler, and collides with a saved register that tends to be
non-zero.
As far as I can see this has been wrong since the original merge of
64-bit ppc support, back in 2002.
Conceptually swapper should have no regs, it never entered from
userspace, and in fact that's what we do on 32-bit. It's also
presumably what the "bogus" comment is referring to.
So I think the right fix is to just not-initialise regs at all. I'm
slightly worried this will break some code that isn't prepared for a
NULL regs, but we'll have to see.
Remove the comment in head_64.S which refers to us setting up the
regs (even though we never did), and is otherwise not really accurate
any more.
Reported-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200428123130.73078-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit be5470e0c285a68dc3afdea965032f5ddc8269d7 upstream.
'mem=" option is an easy way to put high pressure on memory during
some test. Hence after applying the memory limit, instead of total
mem, the actual usable memory should be considered when reserving mem
for crashkernel. Otherwise the boot up may experience OOM issue.
E.g. it would reserve 4G prior to the change and 512M afterward, if
passing
crashkernel="2G-4G:384M,4G-16G:512M,16G-64G:1G,64G-128G:2G,128G-:4G",
and mem=5G on a 256G machine.
This issue is powerpc specific because it puts higher priority on
fadump and kdump reservation than on "mem=". Referring the following
code:
if (fadump_reserve_mem() == 0)
reserve_crashkernel();
...
/* Ensure that total memory size is page-aligned. */
limit = ALIGN(memory_limit ?: memblock_phys_mem_size(), PAGE_SIZE);
memblock_enforce_memory_limit(limit);
While on other arches, the effect of "mem=" takes a higher priority
and pass through memblock_phys_mem_size() before calling
reserve_crashkernel().
Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1585749644-4148-1-git-send-email-kernelfans@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.48 stable release
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commit 912c0a7f2b5daa3cbb2bc10f303981e493de73bd upstream.
At boot the FSCR is initialised via one of two paths. On most systems
it's set to a hard coded value in __init_FSCR().
On newer skiboot systems we use the device tree CPU features binding,
where firmware can tell Linux what bits to set in FSCR (and HFSCR).
In both cases the value that's configured at boot is not propagated
into the init_task.thread.fscr value prior to the initial fork of init
(pid 1), which means the value is not used by any processes other than
swapper (the idle task).
For the __init_FSCR() case this is OK, because the value in
init_task.thread.fscr is initialised to something sensible. However it
does mean that the value set in __init_FSCR() is not used other than
for swapper, which is odd and confusing.
The bigger problem is for the device tree CPU features case it
prevents firmware from setting (or clearing) FSCR bits for use by user
space. This means all existing kernels can not have features
enabled/disabled by firmware if those features require
setting/clearing FSCR bits.
We can handle both cases by saving the FSCR value into
init_task.thread.fscr after we have initialised it at boot. This fixes
the bug for device tree CPU features, and will allow us to simplify
the initialisation for the __init_FSCR() case in a future patch.
Fixes: 5a61ef74f269 ("powerpc/64s: Support new device tree binding for discovering CPU features")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527145843.2761782-3-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 993e3d96fd08c3ebf7566e43be9b8cd622063e6d upstream.
The device tree CPU features binding includes FSCR bit numbers which
Linux is instructed to set by firmware.
Whether that's a good idea or not, in the case of the DSCR the Linux
implementation has a hard requirement that the FSCR_DSCR bit not be
set by default. We use it to track when a process reads/writes to
DSCR, so it must be clear to begin with.
So if firmware tells us to set FSCR_DSCR we must ignore it.
Currently this does not cause a bug in our DSCR handling because the
value of FSCR that the device tree CPU features code establishes is
only used by swapper. All other tasks use the value hard coded in
init_task.thread.fscr.
However we'd like to fix that in a future commit, at which point this
will become necessary.
Fixes: 5a61ef74f269 ("powerpc/64s: Support new device tree binding for discovering CPU features")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200527145843.2761782-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.46 stable release
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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commit 9c4e4c90ec24652921e31e9551fcaedc26eec86d upstream.
Otherwise, the following warning is encountered:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x3dc6): Section mismatch in reference from the variable start_here_multiplatform to the function .init.text:.early_setup()
The function start_here_multiplatform() references
the function __init .early_setup().
This is often because start_here_multiplatform lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of .early_setup is wrong.
Fixes: 56c46bba9bbf ("powerpc/64: Fix booting large kernels with STRICT_KERNEL_RWX")
Cc: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a278e7ea608bea5fe6df9b6ae91fa134655c5d2c upstream.
If you compile with KVM but without CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT you fail
at linking with:
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.o:(.text+0x708): undefined reference to `dawr_force_enable'
This was caused by commit c1fe190c0672 ("powerpc: Add force enable of
DAWR on P9 option").
This moves a bunch of code around to fix this. It moves a lot of the
DAWR code in a new file and creates a new CONFIG_PPC_DAWR to enable
compiling it.
Fixes: c1fe190c0672 ("powerpc: Add force enable of DAWR on P9 option")
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
[mpe: Minor formatting in set_dawr()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.43 stable release
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This is the 5.2.42 stable release
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commit feb8e960d780e170e992a70491eec9dd68f4dbf2 upstream.
CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG is not selectable because it depends on PPC_32
which doesn't exists.
Fixing it leads to a deadlock due to a vital register getting
clobbered in _switch().
Change dependency to PPC32 and use r0 instead of r4 in _switch()
Fixes: e2fb9f544431 ("powerpc/32: Prepare for Kernel Userspace Access Protection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/540242f7d4573f7cdf1b3bf46bb35f743b2cd68f.1587124651.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 94c0b013c98583614e1ad911e8795ca36da34a85 upstream.
If {i,d}-cache-block-size is set and {i,d}-cache-line-size is not, use
the block-size value for both. Per the devicetree spec cache-line-size
is only needed if it differs from the block size.
Originally the code would fallback from block size to line size. An
error message was printed if both properties were missing.
Later the code was refactored to use clearer names and logic but it
inadvertently made line size a required property, meaning on systems
without a line size property we fall back to the default from the
cputable.
On powernv (OPAL) platforms, since the introduction of device tree CPU
features (5a61ef74f269 ("powerpc/64s: Support new device tree binding
for discovering CPU features")), that has led to the wrong value being
used, as the fallback value is incorrect for Power8/Power9 CPUs.
The incorrect values flow through to the VDSO and also to the sysconf
values, SC_LEVEL1_ICACHE_LINESIZE etc.
Fixes: bd067f83b084 ("powerpc/64: Fix naming of cache block vs. cache line")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
[mpe: Add even more detail to change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200416221908.7886-1-chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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enabled"
commit abc3fce76adbdfa8f87272c784b388cd20b46049 upstream.
This reverts commit ebb37cf3ffd39fdb6ec5b07111f8bb2f11d92c5f.
That commit does not play well with soft-masked irq state
manipulations in idle, interrupt replay, and possibly others due to
tracing code sometimes using irq_work_queue (e.g., in
trace_hardirqs_on()). That can cause PACA_IRQ_DEC to become set when
it is not expected, and be ignored or cleared or cause warnings.
The net result seems to be missing an irq_work until the next timer
interrupt in the worst case which is usually not going to be noticed,
however it could be a long time if the tick is disabled, which is
against the spirit of irq_work and might cause real problems.
The idea is still solid, but it would need more work. It's not really
clear if it would be worth added complexity, so revert this for
now (not a straight revert, but replace with a comment explaining why
we might see interrupts happening, and gives git blame something to
find).
Fixes: ebb37cf3ffd3 ("powerpc/64: irq_work avoid interrupt when called with hardware irqs enabled")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200402120401.1115883-1-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7053f80d96967d8e72e9f2a724bbfc3906ce2b07 upstream.
The previous commit reduced the amount of code that is run before we
setup a paca. However there are still a few remaining functions that
run with no paca, or worse, with an arbitrary value in r13 that will
be used as a paca pointer.
In particular the stack protector canary is stored in the paca, so if
stack protector is activated for any of these functions we will read
the stack canary from wherever r13 points. If r13 happens to point
outside of memory we will get a machine check / checkstop.
For example if we modify initialise_paca() to trigger stack
protection, and then boot in the mambo simulator with r13 poisoned in
skiboot before calling the kernel:
DEBUG: 19952232: (19952232): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC0000000191FC1E8: [0x3C4C006D]: addis r2,r12,0x6D [fetch]
DEBUG: 19952236: (19952236): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC00000001807EAD8: [0x7D8802A6]: mflr r12 [fetch]
FATAL ERROR: 19952276: (19952276): Check Stop for 0:0: Machine Check with ME bit of MSR off
DEBUG: 19952276: (19952276): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC0000000191FCA7C: [0xE90D0CF8]: ld r8,0xCF8(r13) [Instruction Failed]
INFO: 19952276: (19952277): ** Execution stopped: Mambo Error, Machine Check Stop, **
systemsim % bt
pc: 0xC0000000191FCA7C initialise_paca+0x54
lr: 0xC0000000191FC22C early_setup+0x44
stack:0x00000000198CBED0 0x0 +0x0
stack:0x00000000198CBF00 0xC0000000191FC22C early_setup+0x44
stack:0x00000000198CBF90 0x1801C968 +0x1801C968
So annotate the relevant functions to ensure stack protection is never
enabled for them.
Fixes: 06ec27aea9fc ("powerpc/64: add stack protector support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200320032116.1024773-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 21f8b2fa3ca5b01f7a2b51b89ce97a3705a15aa0 upstream.
When a program check exception happens while MMU translation is
disabled, following Oops happens in kprobe_handler() in the following
code:
} else if (*addr != BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION) {
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x0000e268
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000ec34
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=16K PREEMPT CMPC885
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 429 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-s3k-dev-00824-g84195dc6c58a #3267
NIP: c000ec34 LR: c000ecd8 CTR: c019cab8
REGS: ca4d3b58 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.6.0-rc1-s3k-dev-00824-g84195dc6c58a)
MSR: 00001032 <ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 2a4d3c52 XER: 00000000
DAR: 0000e268 DSISR: c0000000
GPR00: c000b09c ca4d3c10 c66d0620 00000000 ca4d3c60 00000000 00009032 00000000
GPR08: 00020000 00000000 c087de44 c000afe0 c66d0ad0 100d3dd6 fffffff3 00000000
GPR16: 00000000 00000041 00000000 ca4d3d70 00000000 00000000 0000416d 00000000
GPR24: 00000004 c53b6128 00000000 0000e268 00000000 c07c0000 c07bb6fc ca4d3c60
NIP [c000ec34] kprobe_handler+0x128/0x290
LR [c000ecd8] kprobe_handler+0x1cc/0x290
Call Trace:
[ca4d3c30] [c000b09c] program_check_exception+0xbc/0x6fc
[ca4d3c50] [c000e43c] ret_from_except_full+0x0/0x4
--- interrupt: 700 at 0xe268
Instruction dump:
913e0008 81220000 38600001 3929ffff 91220000 80010024 bb410008 7c0803a6
38210020 4e800020 38600000 4e800020 <813b0000> 6d2a7fe0 2f8a0008 419e0154
---[ end trace 5b9152d4cdadd06d ]---
kprobe is not prepared to handle events in real mode and functions
running in real mode should have been blacklisted, so kprobe_handler()
can safely bail out telling 'this trap is not mine' for any trap that
happened while in real-mode.
If the trap happened with MSR_IR or MSR_DR cleared, return 0
immediately.
Reported-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Fixes: 6cc89bad60a6 ("powerpc/kprobes: Invoke handlers directly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/424331e2006e7291a1bfe40e7f3fa58825f565e1.1582054578.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d4a8e98621543d5798421eed177978bf2b3cdd11 upstream.
Currently we set up the paca after parsing the device tree for CPU
features. Prior to that, r13 contains random data, which means there
is random data in r13 while we're running the generic dt parsing code.
This random data varies depending on whether we boot through a vmlinux
or a zImage: for the vmlinux case it's usually around zero, but for
zImages we see random values like 912a72603d420015.
This is poor practice, and can also lead to difficult-to-debug
crashes. For example, when kcov is enabled, the kcov instrumentation
attempts to read preempt_count out of the current task, which goes via
the paca. This then crashes in the zImage case.
Similarly stack protector can cause crashes if r13 is bogus, by
reading from the stack canary in the paca.
To resolve this:
- move the paca setup to before the CPU feature parsing.
- because we no longer have access to CPU feature flags in paca
setup, change the HV feature test in the paca setup path to consider
the actual value of the MSR rather than the CPU feature.
Translations get switched on once we leave early_setup, so I think
we'd already catch any other cases where the paca or task aren't set
up.
Boot tested on a P9 guest and host.
Fixes: fb0b0a73b223 ("powerpc: Enable kcov")
Fixes: 06ec27aea9fc ("powerpc/64: add stack protector support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
[mpe: Reword comments & change log a bit to mention stack protector]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200320032116.1024773-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c7def7fbdeaa25feaa19caf4a27c5d10bd8789e4 upstream.
In restore_tm_sigcontexts() we take the trap value directly from the
user sigcontext with no checking:
err |= __get_user(regs->trap, &sc->gp_regs[PT_TRAP]);
This means we can be in the kernel with an arbitrary regs->trap value.
Although that's not immediately problematic, there is a risk we could
trigger one of the uses of CHECK_FULL_REGS():
#define CHECK_FULL_REGS(regs) BUG_ON(regs->trap & 1)
It can also cause us to unnecessarily save non-volatile GPRs again in
save_nvgprs(), which shouldn't be problematic but is still wrong.
It's also possible it could trick the syscall restart machinery, which
relies on regs->trap not being == 0xc00 (see 9a81c16b5275 ("powerpc:
fix double syscall restarts")), though I haven't been able to make
that happen.
Finally it doesn't match the behaviour of the non-TM case, in
restore_sigcontext() which zeroes regs->trap.
So change restore_tm_sigcontexts() to zero regs->trap.
This was discovered while testing Nick's upcoming rewrite of the
syscall entry path. In that series the call to save_nvgprs() prior to
signal handling (do_notify_resume()) is removed, which leaves the
low-bit of regs->trap uncleared which can then trigger the FULL_REGS()
WARNs in setup_tm_sigcontexts().
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200401023836.3286664-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.41 stable release
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commit cb0cc635c7a9fa8a3a0f75d4d896721819c63add upstream.
Selecting CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF results in the below warning from ld:
ld: warning: orphan section `.BTF' from `.btf.vmlinux.bin.o' being placed in section `.BTF'
Include .BTF section in vmlinux explicitly to fix the same.
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200220113132.857132-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fc37a1632d40c80c067eb1bc235139f5867a2667 upstream.
PowerVM systems running compatibility mode on a few Power8 revisions are
still vulnerable to the hardware defect that loses PMU exceptions arriving
prior to a context switch.
The software fix for this issue is enabled through the CPU_FTR_PMAO_BUG
cpu_feature bit, nevertheless this bit also needs to be set for PowerVM
compatibility mode systems.
Fixes: 68f2f0d431d9ea4 ("powerpc: Add a cpu feature CPU_FTR_PMAO_BUG")
Signed-off-by: Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario <desnesn@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Leonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200227134715.9715-1-desnesn@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.40 stable release
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commit 2464cc4c345699adea52c7aef75707207cb8a2f6 upstream.
After a treclaim, we expect to be in non-transactional state. If we
don't clear the current thread's MSR[TS] before we get preempted, then
tm_recheckpoint_new_task() will recheckpoint and we get rescheduled in
suspended transaction state.
When handling a signal caught in transactional state,
handle_rt_signal64() calls get_tm_stackpointer() that treclaims the
transaction using tm_reclaim_current() but without clearing the
thread's MSR[TS]. This can cause the TM Bad Thing exception below if
later we pagefault and get preempted trying to access the user's
sigframe, using __put_user(). Afterwards, when we are rescheduled back
into do_page_fault() (but now in suspended state since the thread's
MSR[TS] was not cleared), upon executing 'rfid' after completion of
the page fault handling, the exception is raised because a transition
from suspended to non-transactional state is invalid.
Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception at c00000000000de44 (msr 0x8000000302a03031) tm_scratch=800000010280b033
Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 25 PID: 15547 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2 #32
NIP: c00000000000de44 LR: c000000000034728 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000003fe7bd70 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.4.0-rc2)
MSR: 8000000302a03031 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE,TM[SE]> CR: 44000884 XER: 00000000
CFAR: c00000000000dda4 IRQMASK: 0
PACATMSCRATCH: 800000010280b033
GPR00: c000000000034728 c000000f65a17c80 c000000001662800 00007fffacf3fd78
GPR04: 0000000000001000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8af0
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000078006001 0000000000000000 000c000000000000
GPR12: c000000f611f84b0 c00000003ffcb200 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000000f611f8140
GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffacf3fd68 c000000f65a17d90 c000000f611f7800
GPR28: c000000f65a17e90 c000000f65a17e90 c000000001685e18 00007fffacf3f000
NIP [c00000000000de44] fast_exception_return+0xf4/0x1b0
LR [c000000000034728] handle_rt_signal64+0x78/0xc50
Call Trace:
[c000000f65a17c80] [c000000000034710] handle_rt_signal64+0x60/0xc50 (unreliable)
[c000000f65a17d30] [c000000000023640] do_notify_resume+0x330/0x460
[c000000f65a17e20] [c00000000000dcc4] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74
Instruction dump:
7c4ff120 e8410170 7c5a03a6 38400000 f8410060 e8010070 e8410080 e8610088
60000000 60000000 e8810090 e8210078 <4c000024> 48000000 e8610178 88ed0989
---[ end trace 93094aa44b442f87 ]---
The simplified sequence of events that triggers the above exception is:
... # userspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state
tbegin # userspace in TRANSACTIONAL state
signal delivery # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state
handle_rt_signal64()
get_tm_stackpointer()
treclaim # kernelspace in NON-TRANSACTIONAL state
__put_user()
page fault happens. We will never get back here because of the TM Bad Thing exception.
page fault handling kicks in and we voluntarily preempt ourselves
do_page_fault()
__schedule()
__switch_to(other_task)
our task is rescheduled and we recheckpoint because the thread's MSR[TS] was not cleared
__switch_to(our_task)
switch_to_tm()
tm_recheckpoint_new_task()
trechkpt # kernelspace in SUSPENDED state
The page fault handling resumes, but now we are in suspended transaction state
do_page_fault() completes
rfid <----- trying to get back where the page fault happened (we were non-transactional back then)
TM Bad Thing # illegal transition from suspended to non-transactional
This patch fixes that issue by clearing the current thread's MSR[TS]
just after treclaim in get_tm_stackpointer() so that we stay in
non-transactional state in case we are preempted. In order to make
treclaim and clearing the thread's MSR[TS] atomic from a preemption
perspective when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, preempt_disable/enable() is
used. It's also necessary to save the previous value of the thread's
MSR before get_tm_stackpointer() is called so that it can be exposed
to the signal handler later in setup_tm_sigcontexts() to inform the
userspace MSR at the moment of the signal delivery.
Found with tm-signal-context-force-tm kernel selftest.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Luiz Duarte <gustavold@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211033831.11165-1-gustavold@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a4031afb9d10d97f4d0285844abbc0ab04245304 upstream.
In ITLB miss handled the line supposed to clear bits 20-23 on the L2
ITLB entry is buggy and does indeed nothing, leading to undefined
value which could allow execution when it shouldn't.
Properly do the clearing with the relevant instruction.
Fixes: 74fabcadfd43 ("powerpc/8xx: don't use r12/SPRN_SPRG_SCRATCH2 in TLB Miss handlers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.0+
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Leonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4f70c2778163affce8508a210f65d140e84524b4.1581272050.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1fb4124ca9d456656a324f1ee29b7bf942f59ac8 upstream.
When disabling virtual functions on an SR-IOV adapter we currently do not
correctly remove the EEH state for the now-dead virtual functions. When
removing the pci_dn that was created for the VF when SR-IOV was enabled
we free the corresponding eeh_dev without removing it from the child device
list of the eeh_pe that contained it. This can result in crashes due to the
use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190821062655.19735-1-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3b5b9997b331e77ce967eba2c4bc80dc3134a7fe upstream.
On pseries there is a bug with adding hotplugged devices to an IOMMU
group. For a number of dumb reasons fixing that bug first requires
re-working how VFs are configured on PowerNV. For background, on
PowerNV we use the pcibios_sriov_enable() hook to do two things:
1. Create a pci_dn structure for each of the VFs, and
2. Configure the PHB's internal BARs so the MMIO range for each VF
maps to a unique PE.
Roughly speaking a PE is the hardware counterpart to a Linux IOMMU
group since all the devices in a PE share the same IOMMU table. A PE
also defines the set of devices that should be isolated in response to
a PCI error (i.e. bad DMA, UR/CA, AER events, etc). When isolated all
MMIO and DMA traffic to and from devicein the PE is blocked by the
root complex until the PE is recovered by the OS.
The requirement to block MMIO causes a giant headache because the P8
PHB generally uses a fixed mapping between MMIO addresses and PEs. As
a result we need to delay configuring the IOMMU groups for device
until after MMIO resources are assigned. For physical devices (i.e.
non-VFs) the PE assignment is done in pcibios_setup_bridge() which is
called immediately after the MMIO resources for downstream
devices (and the bridge's windows) are assigned. For VFs the setup is
more complicated because:
a) pcibios_setup_bridge() is not called again when VFs are activated, and
b) The pci_dev for VFs are created by generic code which runs after
pcibios_sriov_enable() is called.
The work around for this is a two step process:
1. A fixup in pcibios_add_device() is used to initialised the cached
pe_number in pci_dn, then
2. A bus notifier then adds the device to the IOMMU group for the PE
specified in pci_dn->pe_number.
A side effect fixing the pseries bug mentioned in the first paragraph
is moving the fixup out of pcibios_add_device() and into
pcibios_bus_add_device(), which is called much later. This results in
step 2. failing because pci_dn->pe_number won't be initialised when
the bus notifier is run.
We can fix this by removing the need for the fixup. The PE for a VF is
known before the VF is even scanned so we can initialise
pci_dn->pe_number pcibios_sriov_enable() instead. Unfortunately,
moving the initialisation causes two problems:
1. We trip the WARN_ON() in the current fixup code, and
2. The EEH core clears pdn->pe_number when recovering a VF and
relies on the fixup to correctly re-set it.
The only justification for either of these is a comment in
eeh_rmv_device() suggesting that pdn->pe_number *must* be set to
IODA_INVALID_PE in order for the VF to be scanned. However, this
comment appears to have no basis in reality. Both bugs can be fixed by
just deleting the code.
Tested-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191028085424.12006-1-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9933819099c4600b41a042f27a074470a43cf6b9 upstream.
Commit f7354ccac844 ("powerpc/32: Remove CURRENT_THREAD_INFO and
rename TI_CPU") broke the CPU wake-up from sleep mode (i.e. when
_TLF_SLEEPING is set) by delaying the tovirt(r2, r2).
This is because r2 is not restored by fast_exception_return. It used
to work (by chance ?) because CPU wake-up interrupt never comes from
user, so r2 is expected to point to 'current' on return.
Commit e2fb9f544431 ("powerpc/32: Prepare for Kernel Userspace Access
Protection") broke it even more by clobbering r0 which is not
restored by fast_exception_return either.
Use r6 instead of r0. This is possible because r3-r6 are restored by
fast_exception_return and only r3-r5 are used for exception arguments.
For r2 it could be converted back to virtual address, but stay on the
safe side and restore it from the stack instead. It should be live
in the cache at that moment, so loading from the stack should make
no difference compared to converting it from phys to virt.
Fixes: f7354ccac844 ("powerpc/32: Remove CURRENT_THREAD_INFO and rename TI_CPU")
Fixes: e2fb9f544431 ("powerpc/32: Prepare for Kernel Userspace Access Protection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6d02c3ae6ad77af34392e98117e44c2bf6d13ba1.1580121710.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c17eb4dca5a353a9dbbb8ad6934fe57af7165e91 upstream.
Declaring setjmp()/longjmp() as taking longs makes the signature
non-standard, and makes clang complain. In the past, this has been
worked around by adding -ffreestanding to the compile flags.
The implementation looks like it only ever propagates the value
(in longjmp) or sets it to 1 (in setjmp), and we only call longjmp
with integer parameters.
This allows removing -ffreestanding from the compilation flags.
Fixes: c9029ef9c957 ("powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Clement Courbet <courbet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200330080400.124803-1-courbet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 71eb40fc53371bc247c8066ae76ad9e22ae1e18d upstream.
When enabling CONFIG_RELOCATABLE and CONFIG_KASAN on FSL_BOOKE,
the kernel doesn't boot.
relocate_init() requires KASAN early shadow area to be set up because
it needs access to the device tree through generic functions.
Call kasan_early_init() before calling relocate_init()
Reported-by: Lexi Shao <shaolexi@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2edb16efc899 ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b58426f1664a4b344ff696d18cacf3b3e8962111.1575036985.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0a87ccd3699983645f54cafd2258514a716b20b8 upstream.
Advertise client support for the PAPR architected ibm,drc-info device
tree property during CAS handshake.
Fixes: c7a3275e0f9e ("powerpc/pseries: Revert support for ibm,drc-info devtree property")
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573449697-5448-11-git-send-email-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3b05a1e517e1a8cfda4866ec31d28b2bc4fee4c4 upstream.
"powerpc_security_features" is "unsigned long", i.e. 32-bit or 64-bit,
depending on the platform (PPC_FSL_BOOK3E or PPC_BOOK3S_64). Hence
casting its address to "u64 *", and calling debugfs_create_x64() is
wrong, and leaks 32-bit of nearby data to userspace on 32-bit platforms.
While all currently defined SEC_FTR_* security feature flags fit in
32-bit, they all have "ULL" suffixes to make them 64-bit constants.
Hence fix the leak by changing the type of "powerpc_security_features"
(and the parameter types of its accessors) to "u64". This also allows
to drop the cast.
Fixes: 398af571128fe75f ("powerpc/security: Show powerpc_security_features in debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191021142309.28105-1-geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.34 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Sat 07 Mar 2020 07:25:00 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit d7e02f7b7991dbe14a2acfb0e53d675cd149001c upstream.
Avoids confusion when printing Oops message like below
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000008bdb4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
This was because we never clear the MMU_FTR_HPTE_TABLE feature flag
even if we run with radix translation. It was discussed that we should
look at this feature flag as an indication of the capability to run
hash translation and we should not clear the flag even if we run in
radix translation. All the code paths check for radix_enabled() check and
if found true consider we are running with radix translation. Follow the
same sequence for finding the MMU translation string to be used in Oops
message.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190711145814.17970-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 4e706af3cd8e1d0503c25332b30cad33c97ed442 upstream.
The issue was showing "Mitigation" message via sysfs whatever the
state of "RFI Flush", but it should show "Vulnerable" when it is
disabled.
If you have "L1D private" feature enabled and not "RFI Flush" you are
vulnerable to meltdown attacks.
"RFI Flush" is the key feature to mitigate the meltdown whatever the
"L1D private" state.
SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV is a feature for Power9 only.
So the message should be as the truth table shows:
CPU | L1D private | RFI Flush | sysfs
----|-------------|-----------|-------------------------------------
P9 | False | False | Vulnerable
P9 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
P9 | True | False | Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
P9 | True | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
P8 | False | False | Vulnerable
P8 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush
Output before this fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: L1D private per thread
Output after fix:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Vulnerable: L1D private per thread
Signed-off-by: Gustavo L. F. Walbon <gwalbon@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190502210907.42375-1-gwalbon@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8e6b6da91ac9b9ec5a925b6cb13f287a54bd547d upstream.
Some PowerPC CPUs are vulnerable to L1TF to the same extent as to
Meltdown. It is also mitigated by flushing the L1D on privilege
transition.
Currently the sysfs gives a false negative on L1TF on CPUs that I
verified to be vulnerable, a Power9 Talos II Boston 004e 1202, PowerNV
T2P9D01.
Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[mpe: Just have cpu_show_l1tf() call cpu_show_meltdown() directly]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191029190759.84821-1-asteinhauser@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit eb8e20f89093b64f48975c74ccb114e6775cee22 upstream.
accumulate_stolen_time() is called prior to interrupt state being
reconciled, which can trip the warning in arch_local_irq_restore():
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1017 at arch/powerpc/kernel/irq.c:258 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x9c/0x130
...
NIP .arch_local_irq_restore+0x9c/0x130
LR .rb_start_commit+0x38/0x80
Call Trace:
.ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0xe4/0x620
.trace_function+0x44/0x210
.function_trace_call+0x148/0x170
.ftrace_ops_no_ops+0x180/0x1d0
ftrace_call+0x4/0x8
.accumulate_stolen_time+0x1c/0xb0
decrementer_common+0x124/0x160
For now just mark it as notrace. We may change the ordering to call it
after interrupt state has been reconciled, but that is a larger
change.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191024055932.27940-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.33 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Tue 25 Feb 2020 12:02:41 AM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 099bc4812f09155da77eeb960a983470249c9ce1 upstream.
Before commit 0366a1c70b89 ("powerpc/irq: Run softirqs off the top of
the irq stack"), check_stack_overflow() was called by do_IRQ(), before
switching to the irq stack.
In that commit, do_IRQ() was renamed __do_irq(), and is now executing
on the irq stack, so check_stack_overflow() has just become almost
useless.
Move check_stack_overflow() call in do_IRQ() to do the check while
still on the current stack.
Fixes: 0366a1c70b89 ("powerpc/irq: Run softirqs off the top of the irq stack")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e033aa8116ab12b7ca9a9c75189ad0741e3b9b5f.1575872340.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 5.2.31 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Fri 31 Jan 2020 04:58:15 PM EST
# gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
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commit 552263456215ada7ee8700ce022d12b0cffe4802 upstream.
clock_getres in the vDSO library has to preserve the same behaviour
of posix_get_hrtimer_res().
In particular, posix_get_hrtimer_res() does:
sec = 0;
ns = hrtimer_resolution;
and hrtimer_resolution depends on the enablement of the high
resolution timers that can happen either at compile or at run time.
Fix the powerpc vdso implementation of clock_getres keeping a copy of
hrtimer_resolution in vdso data and using that directly.
Fixes: a7f290dad32e ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to 32 bits kernel")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
[chleroy: changed CLOCK_REALTIME_RES to CLOCK_HRTIMER_RES]
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a55eca3a5e85233838c2349783bcb5164dae1d09.1575273217.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c9029ef9c95765e7b63c4d9aa780674447db1ec0 upstream.
Commit aea447141c7e ("powerpc: Disable -Wbuiltin-requires-header when
setjmp is used") disabled -Wbuiltin-requires-header because of a
warning about the setjmp and longjmp declarations.
r367387 in clang added another diagnostic around this, complaining
that there is no jmp_buf declaration.
In file included from ../arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c:47:
../arch/powerpc/include/asm/setjmp.h:10:13: error: declaration of
built-in function 'setjmp' requires the declaration of the 'jmp_buf'
type, commonly provided in the header <setjmp.h>.
[-Werror,-Wincomplete-setjmp-declaration]
extern long setjmp(long *);
^
../arch/powerpc/include/asm/setjmp.h:11:13: error: declaration of
built-in function 'longjmp' requires the declaration of the 'jmp_buf'
type, commonly provided in the header <setjmp.h>.
[-Werror,-Wincomplete-setjmp-declaration]
extern void longjmp(long *, long);
^
2 errors generated.
We are not using the standard library's longjmp/setjmp implementations
for obvious reasons; make this clear to clang by using -ffreestanding
on these files.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Suggested-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119045712.39633-3-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 29430fae82073d39b1b881a3cd507416a56a363f upstream.
When calling flush_icache_range with a size >4GB, we were masking
off the upper 32 bits, so we would incorrectly flush a range smaller
than intended.
This patch replaces the 32 bit shifts with 64 bit ones, so that
the full size is accounted for.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-2-alastair@au1.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit f9ec11165301982585e5e5f606739b5bae5331f3 upstream.
When calling __kernel_sync_dicache with a size >4GB, we were masking
off the upper 32 bits, so we would incorrectly flush a range smaller
than intended.
This patch replaces the 32 bit shifts with 64 bit ones, so that
the full size is accounted for.
Signed-off-by: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104023305.9581-3-alastair@au1.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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