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This is the 4.18.42 stable release
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commit 56c46bba9bbfe229b4472a5be313c44c5b714a39 upstream.
With STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled anything marked __init is placed at a 16M
boundary. This is necessary so that it can be repurposed later with
different permissions. However, in kernels with text larger than 16M,
this pushes early_setup past 32M, incapable of being reached by the
branch instruction.
Fix this by setting the CTR and branching there instead.
Fixes: 1e0fc9d1eb2b ("powerpc/Kconfig: Enable STRICT_KERNEL_RWX for some configs")
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
[mpe: Fix it to work on BE by using DOTSYM()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.41 stable release
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commit 7ae3f6e130e8dc6188b59e3b4ebc2f16e9c8d053 upstream.
Using a jiffies timer creates a dependency on the tick_do_timer_cpu
incrementing jiffies. If that CPU has locked up and jiffies is not
incrementing, the watchdog heartbeat timer for all CPUs stops and
creates false positives and confusing warnings on local CPUs, and
also causes the SMP detector to stop, so the root cause is never
detected.
Fix this by using hrtimer based timers for the watchdog heartbeat,
like the generic kernel hardlockup detector.
Cc: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ravikumar Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.40 stable release
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commit a3f3072db6cad40895c585dce65e36aab997f042 upstream.
Without restoring the IAMR after idle, execution prevention on POWER9
with Radix MMU is overwritten and the kernel can freely execute
userspace without faulting.
This is necessary when returning from any stop state that modifies
user state, as well as hypervisor state.
To test how this fails without this patch, load the lkdtm driver and
do the following:
$ echo EXEC_USERSPACE > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
which won't fault, then boot the kernel with powersave=off, where it
will fault. Applying this patch will fix this.
Fixes: 3b10d0095a1e ("powerpc/mm/radix: Prevent kernel execution of user space")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Akshay Adiga <akshay.adiga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.39 stable release
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commit 298a32b132087550d3fa80641ca58323c5dfd4d9 upstream.
Commit 2d4f567103ff ("KVM: PPC: Introduce kvm_tmp framework") adds
kvm_tmp[] into the .bss section and then free the rest of unused spaces
back to the page allocator.
kernel_init
kvm_guest_init
kvm_free_tmp
free_reserved_area
free_unref_page
free_unref_page_prepare
With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y, it will unmap those pages from kernel. As the
result, kmemleak scan will trigger a panic when it scans the .bss
section with unmapped pages.
This patch creates dedicated kmemleak objects for the .data, .bss and
potentially .data..ro_after_init sections to allow partial freeing via
the kmemleak_free_part() in the powerpc kvm_free_tmp() function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190321171917.62049-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.38 stable release
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This is the 4.18.37 stable release
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commit dd9a994fc68d196a052b73747e3366c57d14a09e upstream.
Commit b5b4453e7912 ("powerpc/vdso64: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC
inconsistencies across Y2038") changed the type of wtom_clock_sec
to s64 on PPC64. Therefore, VDSO32 needs to read it with a 4 bytes
shift in order to retrieve the lower part of it.
Fixes: b5b4453e7912 ("powerpc/vdso64: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC inconsistencies across Y2038")
Reported-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 42e2acde1237878462b028f5a27d9cc5bea7502c upstream.
Current powerpc security.c file is defining functions, as
cpu_show_meltdown(), cpu_show_spectre_v{1,2} and others, that are being
declared at linux/cpu.h header without including the header file that
contains these declarations.
This is being reported by sparse, which thinks that these functions are
static, due to the lack of declaration:
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c:105:9: warning: symbol 'cpu_show_meltdown' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c:139:9: warning: symbol 'cpu_show_spectre_v1' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c:161:9: warning: symbol 'cpu_show_spectre_v2' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c:209:6: warning: symbol 'stf_barrier' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c:289:9: warning: symbol 'cpu_show_spec_store_bypass' was not declared. Should it be static?
This patch simply includes the proper header (linux/cpu.h) to match
function definition and declaration.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.36 stable release
Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
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commit cd24e457fd8b2d087d9236700c8d2957054598bf upstream.
When a PRRN event is received we are already running in a worker
thread. Instead of spawning off another worker thread on the prrn_work
workqueue to handle the PRRN event we can just call the PRRN handler
routine directly.
With this update we can also pass the scope variable for the PRRN
event directly to the handler instead of it being a global variable.
This patch fixes the following oops mnessage we are seeing in PRRN testing:
Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc fscache binfmt_misc reiserfs vfat fat rpadlpar_io(X) rpaphp(X) tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag af_packet xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmveth(X) ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas rtc_generic btrfs xor raid6_pq sd_mod ibmvscsi(X) scsi_transport_srp ipr(X) libata sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
Supported: Yes, External 54
CPU: 7 PID: 18967 Comm: kworker/u96:0 Tainted: G X 4.4.126-94.22-default #1
Workqueue: pseries hotplug workque pseries_hp_work_fn
task: c000000775367790 ti: c00000001ebd4000 task.ti: c00000070d140000
NIP: 0000000000000000 LR: 000000001fb3d050 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c00000001ebd7d40 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G X (4.4.126-94.22-default)
MSR: 8000000102081000 <41,VEC,ME5 CR: 28000002 XER: 20040018 4
CFAR: 000000001fb3d084 40 419 1 3
GPR00: 000000000000000040000000000010007 000000001ffff400 000000041fffe200
GPR04: 000000000000008050000000000000000 000000001fb15fa8 0000000500000500
GPR08: 000000000001f40040000000000000001 0000000000000000 000005:5200040002
GPR12: 00000000000000005c000000007a05400 c0000000000e89f8 000000001ed9f668
GPR16: 000000001fbeff944000000001fbeff94 000000001fb545e4 0000006000000060
GPR20: ffffffffffffffff4ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR24: 00000000000000005400000001fb3c000 0000000000000000 000000001fb1b040
GPR28: 000000001fb240004000000001fb440d8 0000000000000008 0000000000000000
NIP [0000000000000000] 5 (null)
LR [000000001fb3d050] 031fb3d050
Call Trace: 4
Instruction dump: 4 5:47 12 2
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX4XX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXX5XX XXXXXXXX 60000000 60000000 60000000 60000000
---[ end trace aa5627b04a7d9d6b ]--- 3NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#27 stuck for 23s! [kworker/27:0:13903]
Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc fscache binfmt_misc reiserfs vfat fat rpadlpar_io(X) rpaphp(X) tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag af_packet xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmveth(X) ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas rtc_generic btrfs xor raid6_pq sd_mod ibmvscsi(X) scsi_transport_srp ipr(X) libata sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4
Supported: Yes, External
CPU: 27 PID: 13903 Comm: kworker/27:0 Tainted: G D X 4.4.126-94.22-default #1
Workqueue: events prrn_work_fn
task: c000000747cfa390 ti: c00000074712c000 task.ti: c00000074712c000
NIP: c0000000008002a8 LR: c000000000090770 CTR: 000000000032e088
REGS: c00000074712f7b0 TRAP: 0901 Tainted: G D X (4.4.126-94.22-default)
MSR: 8000000100009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 22482044 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c0000000008002c4 SOFTE: 1
GPR00: c000000000090770 c00000074712fa30 c000000000f09800 c000000000fa1928 6:02
GPR04: c000000775f5e000 fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000001 c000000000f42db8
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000080000007 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
GPR12: 8006210083180000 c000000007a14400
NIP [c0000000008002a8] _raw_spin_lock+0x68/0xd0
LR [c000000000090770] mobility_rtas_call+0x50/0x100
Call Trace: 59 5
[c00000074712fa60] [c000000000090770] mobility_rtas_call+0x50/0x100
[c00000074712faf0] [c000000000090b08] pseries_devicetree_update+0xf8/0x530
[c00000074712fc20] [c000000000031ba4] prrn_work_fn+0x34/0x50
[c00000074712fc40] [c0000000000e0390] process_one_work+0x1a0/0x4e0
[c00000074712fcd0] [c0000000000e0870] worker_thread+0x1a0/0x6105:57 2
[c00000074712fd80] [c0000000000e8b18] kthread+0x128/0x150
[c00000074712fe30] [c0000000000096f8] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Instruction dump:
2c090000 40c20010 7d40192d 40c2fff0 7c2004ac 2fa90000 40de0018 5:540030 3
e8010010 ebe1fff8 7c0803a6 4e800020 <7c210b78> e92d0000 89290009 792affe3
Signed-off-by: John Allen <jallen@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Fontenot <nfont@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.35 stable release
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commit eddd0b332304d554ad6243942f87c2fcea98c56b upstream.
The ppc64 specific implementation of the reliable stacktracer,
save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable(), bails out and reports an "unreliable
trace" whenever it finds an exception frame on the stack. Stack frames
are classified as exception frames if the STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER
magic, as written by exception prologues, is found at a particular
location.
However, as observed by Joe Lawrence, it is possible in practice that
non-exception stack frames can alias with prior exception frames and
thus, that the reliable stacktracer can find a stale
STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER on the stack. It in turn falsely reports an
unreliable stacktrace and blocks any live patching transition to
finish. Said condition lasts until the stack frame is
overwritten/initialized by function call or other means.
In principle, we could mitigate this by making the exception frame
classification condition in save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() stronger:
in addition to testing for STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER, we could also take
into account that for all exceptions executing on the kernel stack
- their stack frames's backlink pointers always match what is saved
in their pt_regs instance's ->gpr[1] slot and that
- their exception frame size equals STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE, a value
uncommonly large for non-exception frames.
However, while these are currently true, relying on them would make
the reliable stacktrace implementation more sensitive towards future
changes in the exception entry code. Note that false negatives, i.e.
not detecting exception frames, would silently break the live patching
consistency model.
Furthermore, certain other places (diagnostic stacktraces, perf, xmon)
rely on STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER as well.
Make the exception exit code clear the on-stack
STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER for those exceptions running on the "normal"
kernel stack and returning to kernelspace: because the topmost frame
is ignored by the reliable stack tracer anyway, returns to userspace
don't need to take care of clearing the marker.
Furthermore, as I don't have the ability to test this on Book 3E or 32
bits, limit the change to Book 3S and 64 bits.
Fixes: df78d3f61480 ("powerpc/livepatch: Implement reliable stack tracing for the consistency model")
Reported-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ea84b580b95521644429cc6748b6c2bf27c8b0f3 upstream.
Instead of running with interrupts disabled, use a semaphore. This should
make it easier for backends that may need to sleep (e.g. EFI) when
performing a write:
|BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/sched/completion.c:99
|in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 2236, name: sig-xstate-bum
|Preemption disabled at:
|[<ffffffff99d60512>] pstore_dump+0x72/0x330
|CPU: 26 PID: 2236 Comm: sig-xstate-bum Tainted: G D 4.20.0-rc3 #45
|Call Trace:
| dump_stack+0x4f/0x6a
| ___might_sleep.cold.91+0xd3/0xe4
| __might_sleep+0x50/0x90
| wait_for_completion+0x32/0x130
| virt_efi_query_variable_info+0x14e/0x160
| efi_query_variable_store+0x51/0x1a0
| efivar_entry_set_safe+0xa3/0x1b0
| efi_pstore_write+0x109/0x140
| pstore_dump+0x11c/0x330
| kmsg_dump+0xa4/0xd0
| oops_exit+0x22/0x30
...
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 21b3ddd39fee ("efi: Don't use spinlocks for efi vars")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.34 stable release
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commit 92edf8df0ff2ae86cc632eeca0e651fd8431d40d upstream.
When I updated the spectre_v2 reporting to handle software count cache
flush I got the logic wrong when there's no software count cache
enabled at all.
The result is that on systems with the software count cache flush
disabled we print:
Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled, Software count cache flush
Which correctly indicates that the count cache is disabled, but
incorrectly says the software count cache flush is enabled.
The root of the problem is that we are trying to handle all
combinations of options. But we know now that we only expect to see
the software count cache flush enabled if the other options are false.
So split the two cases, which simplifies the logic and fixes the bug.
We were also missing a space before "(hardware accelerated)".
The result is we see one of:
Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)
Mitigation: Indirect branch cache disabled
Mitigation: Software count cache flush
Mitigation: Software count cache flush (hardware accelerated)
Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 27da80719ef132cf8c80eb406d5aeb37dddf78cc upstream.
The commit identified below adds MC_BTB_FLUSH macro only when
CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E is defined. This results in the following error
on some configs (seen several times with kisskb randconfig_defconfig)
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.S:576: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `mc_btb_flush'
make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:367: arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64e.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:492: arch/powerpc/kernel] Error 2
make[1]: *** [Makefile:1043: arch/powerpc] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:152: sub-make] Error 2
This patch adds a blank definition of MC_BTB_FLUSH for other cases.
Fixes: 10c5e83afd4a ("powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (64bit)")
Cc: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 039daac5526932ec731e4499613018d263af8b3e upstream.
Fixed the following build warning:
powerpc-linux-gnu-ld: warning: orphan section `__btb_flush_fixup' from
`arch/powerpc/kernel/head_44x.o' being placed in section
`__btb_flush_fixup'.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit dfa88658fb0583abb92e062c7a9cd5a5b94f2a46 upstream.
Report branch predictor state flush as a mitigation for
Spectre variant 2.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3bc8ea8603ae4c1e09aca8de229ad38b8091fcb3 upstream.
If the user choses not to use the mitigations, replace
the code sequence with nops.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7fef436295bf6c05effe682c8797dfcb0deb112a upstream.
In order to protect against speculation attacks on
indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at
kernel entry to protect for the following situations:
- userspace process attacking another userspace process
- userspace process attacking the kernel
Basically when the privillege level change (i.e.the kernel
is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 10c5e83afd4a3f01712d97d3bb1ae34d5b74a185 upstream.
In order to protect against speculation attacks on
indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at
kernel entry to protect for the following situations:
- userspace process attacking another userspace process
- userspace process attacking the kernel
Basically when the privillege level change (i.e. the
kernel is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit f633a8ad636efb5d4bba1a047d4a0f1ef719aa06 upstream.
When the command line argument is present, the Spectre variant 2
mitigations are disabled.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 7d8bad99ba5a22892f0cad6881289fdc3875a930 upstream.
Currently for CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E the spectre_v2 file is incorrect:
$ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
"Mitigation: Software count cache flush"
Which is wrong. Fix it to report vulnerable for now.
Fixes: ee13cb249fab ("powerpc/64s: Add support for software count cache flush")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 76a5eaa38b15dda92cd6964248c39b5a6f3a4e9d upstream.
In order to protect against speculation attacks (Spectre
variant 2) on NXP PowerPC platforms, the branch predictor
should be flushed when the privillege level is changed.
This patch is adding the infrastructure to fixup at runtime
the code sections that are performing the branch predictor flush
depending on a boot arg parameter which is added later in a
separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ee13cb249fabdff8b90aaff61add347749280087 upstream.
Some CPU revisions support a mode where the count cache needs to be
flushed by software on context switch. Additionally some revisions may
have a hardware accelerated flush, in which case the software flush
sequence can be shortened.
If we detect the appropriate flag from firmware we patch a branch
into _switch() which takes us to a count cache flush sequence.
That sequence in turn may be patched to return early if we detect that
the CPU supports accelerating the flush sequence in hardware.
Add debugfs support for reporting the state of the flush, as well as
runtime disabling it.
And modify the spectre_v2 sysfs file to report the state of the
software flush.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c28218d4abbf4f2035495334d8bfcba64bda4787 upstream.
Used barrier_nospec to sanitize the syscall table.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 406d2b6ae3420f5bb2b3db6986dc6f0b6dbb637b upstream.
In a subsequent patch we will enable building security.c for Book3E.
However the NXP platforms are not vulnerable to Meltdown, so make the
Meltdown vulnerability reporting PPC_BOOK3S_64 specific.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
[mpe: Split out of larger patch]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit af375eefbfb27cbb5b831984e66d724a40d26b5c upstream.
Currently we require platform code to call setup_barrier_nospec(). But
if we add an empty definition for the !CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC case
then we can call it in setup_arch().
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 179ab1cbf883575c3a585bcfc0f2160f1d22a149 upstream.
Add a config symbol to encode which platforms support the
barrier_nospec speculation barrier. Currently this is just Book3S 64
but we will add Book3E in a future patch.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6453b532f2c8856a80381e6b9a1f5ea2f12294df upstream.
NXP Book3E platforms are not vulnerable to speculative store
bypass, so make the mitigations PPC_BOOK3S_64 specific.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit cf175dc315f90185128fb061dc05b6fbb211aa2f upstream.
The speculation barrier can be disabled from the command line
with the parameter: "nospectre_v1".
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit b5b4453e7912f056da1ca7572574cada32ecb60c upstream.
Jakub Drnec reported:
Setting the realtime clock can sometimes make the monotonic clock go
back by over a hundred years. Decreasing the realtime clock across
the y2k38 threshold is one reliable way to reproduce. Allegedly this
can also happen just by running ntpd, I have not managed to
reproduce that other than booting with rtc at >2038 and then running
ntp. When this happens, anything with timers (e.g. openjdk) breaks
rather badly.
And included a test case (slightly edited for brevity):
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 199309L
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
long get_time(void) {
struct timespec tp;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp);
return tp.tv_sec + tp.tv_nsec / 1000000000;
}
int main(void) {
long last = get_time();
while(1) {
long now = get_time();
if (now < last) {
printf("clock went backwards by %ld seconds!\n", last - now);
}
last = now;
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
Which when run concurrently with:
# date -s 2040-1-1
# date -s 2037-1-1
Will detect the clock going backward.
The root cause is that wtom_clock_sec in struct vdso_data is only a
32-bit signed value, even though we set its value to be equal to
tk->wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec which is 64-bits.
Because the monotonic clock starts at zero when the system boots the
wall_to_montonic.tv_sec offset is negative for current and future
dates. Currently on a freshly booted system the offset will be in the
vicinity of negative 1.5 billion seconds.
However if the wall clock is set past the Y2038 boundary, the offset
from wall to monotonic becomes less than negative 2^31, and no longer
fits in 32-bits. When that value is assigned to wtom_clock_sec it is
truncated and becomes positive, causing the VDSO assembly code to
calculate CLOCK_MONOTONIC incorrectly.
That causes CLOCK_MONOTONIC to jump ahead by ~4 billion seconds which
it is not meant to do. Worse, if the time is then set back before the
Y2038 boundary CLOCK_MONOTONIC will jump backward.
We can fix it simply by storing the full 64-bit offset in the
vdso_data, and using that in the VDSO assembly code. We also shuffle
some of the fields in vdso_data to avoid creating a hole.
The original commit that added the CLOCK_MONOTONIC support to the VDSO
did actually use a 64-bit value for wtom_clock_sec, see commit
a7f290dad32e ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to
32 bits kernel") (Nov 2005). However just 3 days later it was
converted to 32-bits in commit 0c37ec2aa88b ("[PATCH] powerpc: vdso
fixes (take #2)"), and the bug has existed since then AFAICS.
Fixes: 0c37ec2aa88b ("[PATCH] powerpc: vdso fixes (take #2)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.15+
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/HaC.ZfES.62bwlnvAvMP.1STMMj@seznam.cz
Reported-by: Jakub Drnec <jaydee@email.cz>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 897bc3df8c5aebb54c32d831f917592e873d0559 upstream.
Commit e1c3743e1a20 ("powerpc/tm: Set MSR[TS] just prior to recheckpoint")
moved a code block around and this block uses a 'msr' variable outside of
the CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM, however the 'msr' variable is declared
inside a CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM block, causing a possible error when
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTION_MEM is not defined.
error: 'msr' undeclared (first use in this function)
This is not causing a compilation error in the mainline kernel, because
'msr' is being used as an argument of MSR_TM_ACTIVE(), which is defined as
the following when CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is *not* set:
#define MSR_TM_ACTIVE(x) 0
This patch just fixes this issue avoiding the 'msr' variable usage outside
the CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM block, avoiding trusting in the
MSR_TM_ACTIVE() definition.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
Fixes: e1c3743e1a20 ("powerpc/tm: Set MSR[TS] just prior to recheckpoint")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.33 stable release
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commit 9bf3d3c4e4fd82c7174f4856df372ab2a71005b9 upstream.
Today's message is useless:
[ 42.253267] Kernel stack overflow in process (ptrval), r1=c65500b0
This patch fixes it:
[ 66.905235] Kernel stack overflow in process sh[356], r1=c65560b0
Fixes: ad67b74d2469 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.15+
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
[mpe: Use task_pid_nr()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ca6d5149d2ad0a8d2f9c28cbe379802260a0a5e0 upstream.
GCC 8 warns about the logic in vr_get/set(), which with -Werror breaks
the build:
In function ‘user_regset_copyin’,
inlined from ‘vr_set’ at arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c:628:9:
include/linux/regset.h:295:4: error: ‘memcpy’ offset [-527, -529] is
out of the bounds [0, 16] of object ‘vrsave’ with type ‘union
<anonymous>’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c: In function ‘vr_set’:
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c:623:5: note: ‘vrsave’ declared here
} vrsave;
This has been identified as a regression in GCC, see GCC bug 88273.
However we can avoid the warning and also simplify the logic and make
it more robust.
Currently we pass -1 as end_pos to user_regset_copyout(). This says
"copy up to the end of the regset".
The definition of the regset is:
[REGSET_VMX] = {
.core_note_type = NT_PPC_VMX, .n = 34,
.size = sizeof(vector128), .align = sizeof(vector128),
.active = vr_active, .get = vr_get, .set = vr_set
},
The end is calculated as (n * size), ie. 34 * sizeof(vector128).
In vr_get/set() we pass start_pos as 33 * sizeof(vector128), meaning
we can copy up to sizeof(vector128) into/out-of vrsave.
The on-stack vrsave is defined as:
union {
elf_vrreg_t reg;
u32 word;
} vrsave;
And elf_vrreg_t is:
typedef __vector128 elf_vrreg_t;
So there is no bug, but we rely on all those sizes lining up,
otherwise we would have a kernel stack exposure/overwrite on our
hands.
Rather than relying on that we can pass an explict end_pos based on
the sizeof(vrsave). The result should be exactly the same but it's
more obviously not over-reading/writing the stack and it avoids the
compiler warning.
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Reported-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fe1ef6bcdb4fca33434256a802a3ed6aacf0bd2f upstream.
Commit 8792468da5e1 "powerpc: Add the ability to save FPU without
giving it up" unexpectedly removed the MSR_FE0 and MSR_FE1 bits from
the bitmask used to update the MSR of the previous thread in
__giveup_fpu() causing a KVM-PR MacOS guest to lockup and panic the
host kernel.
Leaving FE0/1 enabled means unrelated processes might receive FPEs
when they're not expecting them and crash. In particular if this
happens to init the host will then panic.
eg (transcribed):
qemu-system-ppc[837]: unhandled signal 8 at 12cc9ce4 nip 12cc9ce4 lr 12cc9ca4 code 0
systemd[1]: unhandled signal 8 at 202f02e0 nip 202f02e0 lr 001003d4 code 0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
Reinstate these bits to the MSR bitmask to enable MacOS guests to run
under 32-bit KVM-PR once again without issue.
Fixes: 8792468da5e1 ("powerpc: Add the ability to save FPU without giving it up")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9580b71b5a7863c24a9bd18bcd2ad759b86b1eff upstream.
Clear the on-stack STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER on exception exit in order
to avoid confusing stacktrace like the one below.
Call Trace:
[c0e9dca0] [c01c42a0] print_address_description+0x64/0x2bc (unreliable)
[c0e9dcd0] [c01c4684] kasan_report+0xfc/0x180
[c0e9dd10] [c0895130] memchr+0x24/0x74
[c0e9dd30] [c00a9e38] msg_print_text+0x124/0x574
[c0e9dde0] [c00ab710] console_unlock+0x114/0x4f8
[c0e9de40] [c00adc60] vprintk_emit+0x188/0x1c4
--- interrupt: c0e9df00 at 0x400f330
LR = init_stack+0x1f00/0x2000
[c0e9de80] [c00ae3c4] printk+0xa8/0xcc (unreliable)
[c0e9df20] [c0c27e44] early_irq_init+0x38/0x108
[c0e9df50] [c0c15434] start_kernel+0x310/0x488
[c0e9dff0] [00003484] 0x3484
With this patch the trace becomes:
Call Trace:
[c0e9dca0] [c01c42c0] print_address_description+0x64/0x2bc (unreliable)
[c0e9dcd0] [c01c46a4] kasan_report+0xfc/0x180
[c0e9dd10] [c0895150] memchr+0x24/0x74
[c0e9dd30] [c00a9e58] msg_print_text+0x124/0x574
[c0e9dde0] [c00ab730] console_unlock+0x114/0x4f8
[c0e9de40] [c00adc80] vprintk_emit+0x188/0x1c4
[c0e9de80] [c00ae3e4] printk+0xa8/0xcc
[c0e9df20] [c0c27e44] early_irq_init+0x38/0x108
[c0e9df50] [c0c15434] start_kernel+0x310/0x488
[c0e9dff0] [00003484] 0x3484
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.29 stable release
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commit 0db6896ff6332ba694f1e61b93ae3b2640317633 upstream.
For fadump to work successfully there should not be any holes in reserved
memory ranges where kernel has asked firmware to move the content of old
kernel memory in event of crash. Now that fadump uses CMA for reserved
area, this memory area is now not protected from hot-remove operations
unless it is cma allocated. Hence, fadump service can fail to re-register
after the hot-remove operation, if hot-removed memory belongs to fadump
reserved region. To avoid this make sure that memory from fadump reserved
area is not hot-removable if fadump is registered.
However, if user still wants to remove that memory, he can do so by
manually stopping fadump service before hot-remove operation.
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit beba24ac59133cb36ecd03f9af9ccb11971ee20e upstream.
When both `CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION=y` and `CONFIG_UBSAN=y`
are set, link step typically produce numberous warnings about orphan
section:
+ powerpc-linux-gnu-ld -EB -m elf32ppc -Bstatic --orphan-handling=warn --build-id --gc-sections -X -o .tmp_vmlinux1 -T ./arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds --who
le-archive built-in.a --no-whole-archive --start-group lib/lib.a --end-group
powerpc-linux-gnu-ld: warning: orphan section `.data..Lubsan_data393' from `init/main.o' being placed in section `.data..Lubsan_data393'.
powerpc-linux-gnu-ld: warning: orphan section `.data..Lubsan_data394' from `init/main.o' being placed in section `.data..Lubsan_data394'.
...
powerpc-linux-gnu-ld: warning: orphan section `.data..Lubsan_type11' from `init/main.o' being placed in section `.data..Lubsan_type11'.
powerpc-linux-gnu-ld: warning: orphan section `.data..Lubsan_type12' from `init/main.o' being placed in section `.data..Lubsan_type12'.
...
This commit remove those warnings produced at W=1.
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org/msg135407.html
Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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This is the 4.18.25 stable release
# gpg: Signature made Fri 18 Jan 2019 08:58:13 AM EST using RSA key ID 2C07D1D6
# gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found
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commit e1c3743e1a20647c53b719dbf28b48f45d23f2cd upstream.
On a signal handler return, the user could set a context with MSR[TS] bits
set, and these bits would be copied to task regs->msr.
At restore_tm_sigcontexts(), after current task regs->msr[TS] bits are set,
several __get_user() are called and then a recheckpoint is executed.
This is a problem since a page fault (in kernel space) could happen when
calling __get_user(). If it happens, the process MSR[TS] bits were
already set, but recheckpoint was not executed, and SPRs are still invalid.
The page fault can cause the current process to be de-scheduled, with
MSR[TS] active and without tm_recheckpoint() being called. More
importantly, without TEXASR[FS] bit set also.
Since TEXASR might not have the FS bit set, and when the process is
scheduled back, it will try to reclaim, which will be aborted because of
the CPU is not in the suspended state, and, then, recheckpoint. This
recheckpoint will restore thread->texasr into TEXASR SPR, which might be
zero, hitting a BUG_ON().
kernel BUG at /build/linux-sf3Co9/linux-4.9.30/arch/powerpc/kernel/tm.S:434!
cpu 0xb: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000041f1576d0]
pc: c000000000054550: restore_gprs+0xb0/0x180
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: c00000041f157950
msr: 8000000100021033
current = 0xc00000041f143000
paca = 0xc00000000fb86300 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 1021, comm = kworker/11:1
kernel BUG at /build/linux-sf3Co9/linux-4.9.30/arch/powerpc/kernel/tm.S:434!
Linux version 4.9.0-3-powerpc64le (debian-kernel@lists.debian.org) (gcc version 6.3.0 20170516 (Debian 6.3.0-18) ) #1 SMP Debian 4.9.30-2+deb9u2 (2017-06-26)
enter ? for help
[c00000041f157b30] c00000000001bc3c tm_recheckpoint.part.11+0x6c/0xa0
[c00000041f157b70] c00000000001d184 __switch_to+0x1e4/0x4c0
[c00000041f157bd0] c00000000082eeb8 __schedule+0x2f8/0x990
[c00000041f157cb0] c00000000082f598 schedule+0x48/0xc0
[c00000041f157ce0] c0000000000f0d28 worker_thread+0x148/0x610
[c00000041f157d80] c0000000000f96b0 kthread+0x120/0x140
[c00000041f157e30] c00000000000c0e0 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x7c
This patch simply delays the MSR[TS] set, so, if there is any page fault in
the __get_user() section, it does not have regs->msr[TS] set, since the TM
structures are still invalid, thus avoiding doing TM operations for
in-kernel exceptions and possible process reschedule.
With this patch, the MSR[TS] will only be set just before recheckpointing
and setting TEXASR[FS] = 1, thus avoiding an interrupt with TM registers in
invalid state.
Other than that, if CONFIG_PREEMPT is set, there might be a preemption just
after setting MSR[TS] and before tm_recheckpoint(), thus, this block must
be atomic from a preemption perspective, thus, calling
preempt_disable/enable() on this code.
It is not possible to move tm_recheckpoint to happen earlier, because it is
required to get the checkpointed registers from userspace, with
__get_user(), thus, the only way to avoid this undesired behavior is
delaying the MSR[TS] set.
The 32-bits signal handler seems to be safe this current issue, but, it
might be exposed to the preemption issue, thus, disabling preemption in
this chunk of code.
Changes from v2:
* Run the critical section with preempt_disable.
Fixes: 87b4e5393af7 ("powerpc/tm: Fix return of active 64bit signals")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.9+)
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6f5b9f018f4c7686fd944d920209d1382d320e4e upstream.
There is a TM Bad Thing bug that can be caused when you return from a
signal context in a suspended transaction but with ucontext MSR[TS] unset.
This forces regs->msr[TS] to be set at syscall entrance (since the CPU
state is transactional). It also calls treclaim() to flush the transaction
state, which is done based on the live (mfmsr) MSR state.
Since user context MSR[TS] is not set, then restore_tm_sigcontexts() is not
called, thus, not executing recheckpoint, keeping the CPU state as not
transactional. When calling rfid, SRR1 will have MSR[TS] set, but the CPU
state is non transactional, causing the TM Bad Thing with the following
stack:
[ 33.862316] Bad kernel stack pointer 3fffd9dce3e0 at c00000000000c47c
cpu 0x8: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ff7fd40]
pc: c00000000000c47c: fast_exception_return+0xac/0xb4
lr: 00003fff865f442c
sp: 3fffd9dce3e0
msr: 8000000102a03031
current = 0xc00000041f68b700
paca = 0xc00000000fb84800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 1721, comm = tm-signal-sigre
Linux version 4.9.0-3-powerpc64le (debian-kernel@lists.debian.org) (gcc version 6.3.0 20170516 (Debian 6.3.0-18) ) #1 SMP Debian 4.9.30-2+deb9u2 (2017-06-26)
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The same problem happens on 32-bits signal handler, and the fix is very
similar, if tm_recheckpoint() is not executed, then regs->msr[TS] should be
zeroed.
This patch also fixes a sparse warning related to lack of indentation when
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0e ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10+
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit aea447141c7e7824b81b49acd1bc785506fba46e upstream.
The powerpc kernel uses setjmp which causes a warning when building
with clang:
In file included from arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c:51:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/setjmp.h:15:13: error: declaration of
built-in function 'setjmp' requires inclusion of the header <setjmp.h>
[-Werror,-Wbuiltin-requires-header]
extern long setjmp(long *);
^
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/setjmp.h:16:13: error: declaration of
built-in function 'longjmp' requires inclusion of the header <setjmp.h>
[-Werror,-Wbuiltin-requires-header]
extern void longjmp(long *, long);
^
This *is* the header and we're not using the built-in setjump but
rather the one in arch/powerpc/kernel/misc.S. As the compiler warning
does not make sense, it for the files where setjmp is used.
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
[mpe: Move subdir-ccflags in xmon/Makefile to not clobber -Werror]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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