| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
commit 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac upstream.
Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
Spectre v1.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream.
The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled. Enable those features where applicable.
The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can
write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
handler:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible
because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
accesses.
NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
doesn't exist quite yet.
- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the
gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
needs to be read from user space first. Something like:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
mov (%reg1), %reg2
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without
tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
- If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively
disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
- If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably
only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.
[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6e88559470f581741bcd0f2794f9054814ac9740 upstream.
Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs files
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 26cb1f36c43ee6e89d2a9f48a5a7500d5248f836 upstream.
Currently only supported on powerpc.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit e59f5bd759b7dee57593c5b6c0441609bda5d530 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit ea01668f9f43021b28b3f4d5ffad50106a1e1301 upstream
Adjust the last two rows in the table that display possible values when
MDS mitigation is enabled. They both were slightly innacurate.
In addition, convert the table of possible values and their descriptions
to a list-table. The simple table format uses the top border of equals
signs to determine cell width which resulted in the first column being
far too wide in comparison to the second column that contained the
majority of the text.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit e672f8bf71c66253197e503f75c771dd28ada4a0 upstream
Updated the documentation for a new CVE-2019-11091 Microarchitectural Data
Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) which is a variant of
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is a family of side channel
attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs.
MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS. There are no new code changes expected for MDSUM.
The existing mitigation for MDS applies to MDSUM as well.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5c14068f87d04adc73ba3f41c2a303d3c3d1fa12 upstream
Add MDS to the new 'mitigations=' cmdline option.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 0336e04a6520bdaefdb0769d2a70084fa52e81ed upstream
Configure s390 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Spectre v1 and
Spectre v2.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4a161805458a5ec88812aac0307ae3908a030fc.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[PG: align with the 4.14.119 stable version of this change.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 782e69efb3dfed6e8360bc612e8c7827a901a8f9 upstream
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/245a606e1a42a558a310220312d9b6adb9159df6.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream
Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture. Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
a) they want all mitigations off;
b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
it's vulnerable; or
c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:
- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
SMT if needed by a mitigation.
Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything. They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d71eb0ce109a124b0fa714832823b9452f2762cf upstream
Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with
SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5999bbe7a6ea3c62029532ec84dc06003a1fa258 upstream
Add the initial MDS vulnerability documentation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 65fd4cb65b2dad97feb8330b6690445910b56d6a upstream
Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit bc1241700acd82ec69fde98c5763ce51086269f8 upstream
Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.
This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:
mds=[full|off]
This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 60ca05c3b44566b70d64fbb8e87a6e0c67725468 upstream
Fix small typo (wiil -> will) in the "3.4. Nested virtual machines"
section.
Fixes: 5b76a3cff011 ("KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry")
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: trivial@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream.
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.
Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream.
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream.
Now that all prerequisites are in place:
- Add the prctl command line option
- Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'
- When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.
- At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
evaluation on context switch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream.
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=
The initial options are:
- on: Unconditionally enabled
- off: Unconditionally disabled
-auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)
When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 544b03da39e2d7b4961d3163976ed4bfb1fac509 upstream.
At the request of the reporter, the Linux kernel security team offers to
postpone the publishing of a fix for up to 5 business days from the date
of a report.
While it is generally undesirable to keep a fix private after it has
been developed, this short window is intended to allow distributions to
package the fix into their kernel builds and permits early inclusion of
the security team in the case of a co-ordinated disclosure with other
parties. Unfortunately, discussions with major Linux distributions and
cloud providers has revealed that 5 business days is not sufficient to
achieve either of these two goals.
As an example, cloud providers need to roll out KVM security fixes to a
global fleet of hosts with sufficient early ramp-up and monitoring. An
end-to-end timeline of less than two weeks dramatically cuts into the
amount of early validation and increases the chance of guest-visible
regressions.
The consequence of this timeline mismatch is that security issues are
commonly fixed without the involvement of the Linux kernel security team
and are instead analysed and addressed by an ad-hoc group of developers
across companies contributing to Linux. In some cases, mainline (and
therefore the official stable kernels) can be left to languish for
extended periods of time. This undermines the Linux kernel security
process and puts upstream developers in a difficult position should they
find themselves involved with an undisclosed security problem that they
are unable to report due to restrictions from their employer.
To accommodate the needs of these users of the Linux kernel and
encourage them to engage with the Linux security team when security
issues are first uncovered, extend the maximum period for which fixes
may be delayed to 7 calendar days, or 14 calendar days in exceptional
cases, where the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts specifically
need to be accommodated. This brings parity with the linux-distros@
maximum embargo period of 14 calendar days.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Co-developed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 14fdc2c5318ae420e68496975f48dc1dbef52649 upstream.
The Linux kernel security team has been accused of rejecting the idea of
security embargoes. This is incorrect, and could dissuade people from
reporting security issues to us under the false assumption that the
issue would leak prematurely.
Clarify the handling of embargoed information in our process
documentation.
Co-developed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 781f0766cc41a9dd2e5d118ef4b1d5d89430257b upstream.
Devices connected under Terminus Technology Inc. Hub (1a40:0101) may
fail to work after the system resumes from suspend:
[ 206.063325] usb 3-2.4: reset full-speed USB device number 4 using xhci_hcd
[ 206.143691] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
[ 206.351671] usb 3-2.4: device descriptor read/64, error -32
Info for this hub:
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 2 Spd=480 MxCh= 4
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1a40 ProdID=0101 Rev=01.11
S: Product=USB 2.0 Hub
C: #Ifs= 1 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=09(hub ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=hub
Some expirements indicate that the USB devices connected to the hub are
innocent, it's the hub itself is to blame. The hub needs extra delay
time after it resets its port.
Hence wait for extra delay, if the device is connected to this quirky
hub.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d2266bbfa9e3e32e3b642965088ca461bd24a94f upstream.
The "pciserial" earlyprintk variant helps much on many modern x86
platforms, but unfortunately there are still some platforms with PCI
UART devices which have the wrong PCI class code. In that case, the
current class code check does not allow for them to be used for logging.
Add a sub-option "force" which overrides the class code check and thus
the use of such device can be enforced.
[ bp: massage formulations. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Stuart R . Anderson" <stuart.r.anderson@intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thymo van Beers <thymovanbeers@gmail.com>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002164921.25833-1-feng.tang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5b76a3cff011df2dcb6186c965a2e4d809a05ad4 upstream.
When nested virtualization is in use, VMENTER operations from the nested
hypervisor into the nested guest will always be processed by the bare metal
hypervisor, and KVM's "conditional cache flushes" mode in particular does a
flush on nested vmentry. Therefore, include the "skip L1D flush on
vmentry" bit in KVM's suggested ARCH_CAPABILITIES setting.
Add the relevant Documentation.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 58331136136935c631c2b5f06daf4c3006416e91 upstream.
Dave reported, that it's not confirmed that Yonah processors are
unaffected. Remove them from the list.
Reported-by: ave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 1949f9f49792d65dba2090edddbe36a5f02e3ba3 upstream.
Fix spelling and other typos
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3ec8ce5d866ec6a08a9cfab82b62acf4a830b35f upstream.
Add documentation for the L1TF vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs files
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.287429944@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d90a7a0ec83fb86622cd7dae23255d3c50a99ec8 upstream.
Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.
The possible values are:
full
Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
disabled.
full,force
Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
control is disabled.
flush
Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
disabled.
flush,nosmt
Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
hypervisors will issue a warning.
flush,nowarn
Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.
off
Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.
Default is 'flush'.
Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:
- 'lt1f=full,force' : Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
possible.
- 'l1tf=full'
- 'l1tf-flush'
- 'l1tf=flush,nosmt' : Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
has been run-time enabled
- 'l1tf=flush,nowarn' : Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.
- 'l1tf=off' : L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
are emitted.
KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.
This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.
Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a399477e52c17e148746d3ce9a483f681c2aa9a0 upstream.
Add a mitigation mode parameter "vmentry_l1d_flush" for CVE-2018-3620, aka
L1 terminal fault. The valid arguments are:
- "always" L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
- "cond" Conditional L1D cache flush, explained below
- "never" Disable the L1D cache flush mitigation
"cond" is trying to avoid L1D cache flushes on VMENTER if the code executed
between VMEXIT and VMENTER is considered safe, i.e. is not bringing any
interesting information into L1D which might exploited.
[ tglx: Split out from a larger patch ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 26acfb666a473d960f0fd971fe68f3e3ad16c70b upstream.
If the L1TF CPU bug is present we allow the KVM module to be loaded as the
major of users that use Linux and KVM have trusted guests and do not want a
broken setup.
Cloud vendors are the ones that are uncomfortable with CVE 2018-3620 and as
such they are the ones that should set nosmt to one.
Setting 'nosmt' means that the system administrator also needs to disable
SMT (Hyper-threading) in the BIOS, or via the 'nosmt' command line
parameter, or via the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control. See commit
05736e4ac13c ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT").
Other mitigations are to use task affinity, cpu sets, interrupt binding,
etc - anything to make sure that _only_ the same guests vCPUs are running
on sibling threads.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 506a66f374891ff08e064a058c446b336c5ac760 upstream.
Dave Hansen reported, that it's outright dangerous to keep SMT siblings
disabled completely so they are stuck in the BIOS and wait for SIPI.
The reason is that Machine Check Exceptions are broadcasted to siblings and
the soft disabled sibling has CR4.MCE = 0. If a MCE is delivered to a
logical core with CR4.MCE = 0, it asserts IERR#, which shuts down or
reboots the machine. The MCE chapter in the SDM contains the following
blurb:
Because the logical processors within a physical package are tightly
coupled with respect to shared hardware resources, both logical
processors are notified of machine check errors that occur within a
given physical processor. If machine-check exceptions are enabled when
a fatal error is reported, all the logical processors within a physical
package are dispatched to the machine-check exception handler. If
machine-check exceptions are disabled, the logical processors enter the
shutdown state and assert the IERR# signal. When enabling machine-check
exceptions, the MCE flag in control register CR4 should be set for each
logical processor.
Reverting the commit which ignores siblings at enumeration time solves only
half of the problem. The core cpuhotplug logic needs to be adjusted as
well.
This thoughtful engineered mechanism also turns the boot process on all
Intel HT enabled systems into a MCE lottery. MCE is enabled on the boot CPU
before the secondary CPUs are brought up. Depending on the number of
physical cores the window in which this situation can happen is smaller or
larger. On a HSW-EX it's about 750ms:
MCE is enabled on the boot CPU:
[ 0.244017] mce: CPU supports 22 MCE banks
The corresponding sibling #72 boots:
[ 1.008005] .... node #0, CPUs: #72
That means if an MCE hits on physical core 0 (logical CPUs 0 and 72)
between these two points the machine is going to shutdown. At least it's a
known safe state.
It's obvious that the early boot can be hit by an MCE as well and then runs
into the same situation because MCEs are not yet enabled on the boot CPU.
But after enabling them on the boot CPU, it does not make any sense to
prevent the kernel from recovering.
Adjust the nosmt kernel parameter documentation as well.
Reverts: 2207def700f9 ("x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force")
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 05736e4ac13c08a4a9b1ef2de26dd31a32cbee57 upstream.
Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.
The command line options are:
'nosmt': Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them
'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
via MP table and ACPI/MADT.
The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):
'on': SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
'off': SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
cannot be onlined
'forceoff': SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
file are rejected.
'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU
The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.
The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.
When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.
When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.
When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.
When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file
are rejected.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This parameter introduced several years ago in the XHCI host controller
driver was somehow left undocumented. Add a few lines in the kernel
parameters text.
Signed-off-by: Laurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Document the recently introduced hwp_dynamic_boost sysfs knob
allowing user space to tell intel_pstate to use iowait boosting
in the active mode with HWP enabled (to improve performance).
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
|
|
Fix an incorrect sysfs path in the intel_pstate admin-guide
documentation.
Fixes: 33fc30b47098 (cpufreq: intel_pstate: Document the current behavior and user interface)
Reported-by: Pawit Pornkitprasan <p.pawit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
|
|
Fix a typo in the intel_pstate admin-guide documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
|
|
The alsa parameters file was renamed to alsa-configuration.rst.
With regards to OSS, it got retired as a hole by at changeset
727dede0ba8a ("sound: Retire OSS"). So, it doesn't make sense
to keep mentioning it at kernel-parameters.txt.
Fixes: 727dede0ba8a ("sound: Retire OSS")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
|
|
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features
- add support for mapping secids and using secctxes
- add the ability to get a task's secid
- add support for audit rule filtering
Cleanups:
- multiple typo fixes
- Convert to use match_string() helper
- update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs
- improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr
- Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids
Bug fixes:
- fix '*seclen' is never less than zero
- fix mediation of prlimit
- fix memory leak when deduping profile load
- fix ptrace read check
- fix memory leak of rule on error exit path"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-06-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (21 commits)
apparmor: fix ptrace read check
apparmor: fix memory leak when deduping profile load
apparmor: fix mediation of prlimit
apparmor: fixup secid map conversion to using IDR
apparmor: Use an IDR to allocate apparmor secids
apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit path
apparmor: modify audit rule support to support profile stacks
apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering
apparmor: update git and wiki locations in AppArmor docs
apparmor: Convert to use match_string() helper
apparmor: improve get_buffers macro by using get_cpu_ptr
apparmor: fix '*seclen' is never less than zero
apparmor: fix typo "preconfinement"
apparmor: fix typo "independent"
apparmor: fix typo "traverse"
apparmor: fix typo "type"
apparmor: fix typo "replace"
apparmor: fix typo "comparison"
apparmor: fix typo "loosen"
apparmor: add the ability to get a task's secid
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
"Apart from the core arm64 and perf changes, the Spectre v4 mitigation
touches the arm KVM code and the ACPI PPTT support touches drivers/
(acpi and cacheinfo). I should have the maintainers' acks in place.
Summary:
- Spectre v4 mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass Disable) support
for arm64 using SMC firmware call to set a hardware chicken bit
- ACPI PPTT (Processor Properties Topology Table) parsing support and
enable the feature for arm64
- Report signal frame size to user via auxv (AT_MINSIGSTKSZ). The
primary motivation is Scalable Vector Extensions which requires
more space on the signal frame than the currently defined
MINSIGSTKSZ
- ARM perf patches: allow building arm-cci as module, demote
dev_warn() to dev_dbg() in arm-ccn event_init(), miscellaneous
cleanups
- cmpwait() WFE optimisation to avoid some spurious wakeups
- L1_CACHE_BYTES reverted back to 64 (for performance reasons that
have to do with some network allocations) while keeping
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN to 128. cache_line_size() returns the actual
hardware Cache Writeback Granule
- Turn LSE atomics on by default in Kconfig
- Kernel fault reporting tidying
- Some #include and miscellaneous cleanups"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (53 commits)
arm64: Fix syscall restarting around signal suppressed by tracer
arm64: topology: Avoid checking numa mask for scheduler MC selection
ACPI / PPTT: fix build when CONFIG_ACPI_PPTT is not enabled
arm64: cpu_errata: include required headers
arm64: KVM: Move VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG macros to the top of the file
arm64: signal: Report signal frame size to userspace via auxv
arm64/sve: Thin out initialisation sanity-checks for sve_max_vl
arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID
arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests
arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests
arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors
arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation
arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation
arm64: ssbd: Restore mitigation status on CPU resume
arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation
arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor
arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing
arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1
...
|
|
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
- a few misc things
- ocfs2 updates
- v9fs updates
- MM
- procfs updates
- lib/ updates
- autofs updates
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (118 commits)
autofs: small cleanup in autofs_getpath()
autofs: clean up includes
autofs: comment on selinux changes needed for module autoload
autofs: update MAINTAINERS entry for autofs
autofs: use autofs instead of autofs4 in documentation
autofs: rename autofs documentation files
autofs: create autofs Kconfig and Makefile
autofs: delete fs/autofs4 source files
autofs: update fs/autofs4/Makefile
autofs: update fs/autofs4/Kconfig
autofs: copy autofs4 to autofs
autofs4: use autofs instead of autofs4 everywhere
autofs4: merge auto_fs.h and auto_fs4.h
fs/binfmt_misc.c: do not allow offset overflow
checkpatch: improve patch recognition
lib/ucs2_string.c: add MODULE_LICENSE()
lib/mpi: headers cleanup
lib/percpu_ida.c: use _irqsave() instead of local_irq_save() + spin_lock
lib/idr.c: remove simple_ida_lock
lib/bitmap.c: micro-optimization for __bitmap_complement()
...
|
|
Currently an attempt to set swap.max into a value lower than the actual
swap usage fails, which causes configuration problems as there's no way
of lowering the configuration below the current usage short of turning
off swap entirely. This makes swap.max difficult to use and allows
delegatees to lock the delegator out of reducing swap allocation.
This patch updates swap_max_write() so that the limit can be lowered
below the current usage. It doesn't implement active reclaiming of swap
entries for the following reasons.
* mem_cgroup_swap_full() already tells the swap machinary to
aggressively reclaim swap entries if the usage is above 50% of
limit, so simply lowering the limit automatically triggers gradual
reclaim.
* Forcing back swapped out pages is likely to heavily impact the
workload and mess up the working set. Given that swap usually is a
lot less valuable and less scarce, letting the existing usage
dissipate over time through the above gradual reclaim and as they're
falted back in is likely the better behavior.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180523185041.GR1718769@devbig577.frc2.facebook.com
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Memory controller implements the memory.low best-effort memory
protection mechanism, which works perfectly in many cases and allows
protecting working sets of important workloads from sudden reclaim.
But its semantics has a significant limitation: it works only as long as
there is a supply of reclaimable memory. This makes it pretty useless
against any sort of slow memory leaks or memory usage increases. This
is especially true for swapless systems. If swap is enabled, memory
soft protection effectively postpones problems, allowing a leaking
application to fill all swap area, which makes no sense. The only
effective way to guarantee the memory protection in this case is to
invoke the OOM killer.
It's possible to handle this case in userspace by reacting on MEMCG_LOW
events; but there is still a place for a fail-safe in-kernel mechanism
to provide stronger guarantees.
This patch introduces the memory.min interface for cgroup v2 memory
controller. It works very similarly to memory.low (sharing the same
hierarchical behavior), except that it's not disabled if there is no
more reclaimable memory in the system.
If cgroup is not populated, its memory.min is ignored, because otherwise
even the OOM killer wouldn't be able to reclaim the protected memory,
and the system can stall.
[guro@fb.com: s/low/min/ in docs]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180510130758.GA9129@castle.DHCP.thefacebook.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509180734.GA4856@castle.DHCP.thefacebook.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Refine cgroup v2 docs after latest memory.low changes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180405185921.4942-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add swap max and fail events so that userland can monitor and respond to
running out of swap.
I'm not too sure about the fail event. Right now, it's a bit confusing
which stats / events are recursive and which aren't and also which ones
reflect events which originate from a given cgroup and which targets the
cgroup. No idea what the right long term solution is and it could just
be that growing them organically is actually the only right thing to do.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416231151.GI1911913@devbig577.frc2.facebook.com
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci
Pull PCI updates from Bjorn Helgaas:
- unify AER decoding for native and ACPI CPER sources (Alexandru
Gagniuc)
- add TLP header info to AER tracepoint (Thomas Tai)
- add generic pcie_wait_for_link() interface (Oza Pawandeep)
- handle AER ERR_FATAL by removing and re-enumerating devices, as
Downstream Port Containment does (Oza Pawandeep)
- factor out common code between AER and DPC recovery (Oza Pawandeep)
- stop triggering DPC for ERR_NONFATAL errors (Oza Pawandeep)
- share ERR_FATAL recovery path between AER and DPC (Oza Pawandeep)
- disable ASPM L1.2 substate if we don't have LTR (Bjorn Helgaas)
- respect platform ownership of LTR (Bjorn Helgaas)
- clear interrupt status in top half to avoid interrupt storm (Oza
Pawandeep)
- neaten pci=earlydump output (Andy Shevchenko)
- avoid errors when extended config space inaccessible (Gilles Buloz)
- prevent sysfs disable of device while driver attached (Christoph
Hellwig)
- use core interface to report PCIe link properties in bnx2x, bnxt_en,
cxgb4, ixgbe (Bjorn Helgaas)
- remove unused pcie_get_minimum_link() (Bjorn Helgaas)
- fix use-before-set error in ibmphp (Dan Carpenter)
- fix pciehp timeouts caused by Command Completed errata (Bjorn
Helgaas)
- fix refcounting in pnv_php hotplug (Julia Lawall)
- clear pciehp Presence Detect and Data Link Layer Status Changed on
resume so we don't miss hotplug events (Mika Westerberg)
- only request pciehp control if we support it, so platform can use
ACPI hotplug otherwise (Mika Westerberg)
- convert SHPC to be builtin only (Mika Westerberg)
- request SHPC control via _OSC if we support it (Mika Westerberg)
- simplify SHPC handoff from firmware (Mika Westerberg)
- fix an SHPC quirk that mistakenly included *all* AMD bridges as well
as devices from any vendor with device ID 0x7458 (Bjorn Helgaas)
- assign a bus number even to non-native hotplug bridges to leave
space for acpiphp additions, to fix a common Thunderbolt xHCI
hot-add failure (Mika Westerberg)
- keep acpiphp from scanning native hotplug bridges, to fix common
Thunderbolt hot-add failures (Mika Westerberg)
- improve "partially hidden behind bridge" messages from core (Mika
Westerberg)
- add macros for PCIe Link Control 2 register (Frederick Lawler)
- replace IB/hfi1 custom macros with PCI core versions (Frederick
Lawler)
- remove dead microblaze and xtensa code (Bjorn Helgaas)
- use dev_printk() when possible in xtensa and mips (Bjorn Helgaas)
- remove unused pcie_port_acpi_setup() and portdrv_acpi.c (Bjorn
Helgaas)
- add managed interface to get PCI host bridge resources from OF (Jan
Kiszka)
- add support for unbinding generic PCI host controller (Jan Kiszka)
- fix memory leaks when unbinding generic PCI host controller (Jan
Kiszka)
- request legacy VGA framebuffer only for VGA devices to avoid false
device conflicts (Bjorn Helgaas)
- turn on PCI_COMMAND_IO & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY in pci_enable_device()
like everybody else, not in pcibios_fixup_bus() (Bjorn Helgaas)
- add generic enable function for simple SR-IOV hardware (Alexander
Duyck)
- use generic SR-IOV enable for ena, nvme (Alexander Duyck)
- add ACS quirk for Intel 7th & 8th Gen mobile (Alex Williamson)
- add ACS quirk for Intel 300 series (Mika Westerberg)
- enable register clock for Armada 7K/8K (Gregory CLEMENT)
- reduce Keystone "link already up" log level (Fabio Estevam)
- move private DT functions to drivers/pci/ (Rob Herring)
- factor out dwc CONFIG_PCI Kconfig dependencies (Rob Herring)
- add DesignWare support to the endpoint test driver (Gustavo
Pimentel)
- add DesignWare support for endpoint mode (Gustavo Pimentel)
- use devm_ioremap_resource() instead of devm_ioremap() in dra7xx and
artpec6 (Gustavo Pimentel)
- fix Qualcomm bitwise NOT issue (Dan Carpenter)
- add Qualcomm runtime PM support (Srinivas Kandagatla)
- fix DesignWare enumeration below bridges (Koen Vandeputte)
- use usleep() instead of mdelay() in endpoint test (Jia-Ju Bai)
- add configfs entries for pci_epf_driver device IDs (Kishon Vijay
Abraham I)
- clean up pci_endpoint_test driver (Gustavo Pimentel)
- update Layerscape maintainer email addresses (Minghuan Lian)
- add COMPILE_TEST to improve build test coverage (Rob Herring)
- fix Hyper-V bus registration failure caused by domain/serial number
confusion (Sridhar Pitchai)
- improve Hyper-V refcounting and coding style (Stephen Hemminger)
- avoid potential Hyper-V hang waiting for a response that will never
come (Dexuan Cui)
- implement Mediatek chained IRQ handling (Honghui Zhang)
- fix vendor ID & class type for Mediatek MT7622 (Honghui Zhang)
- add Mobiveil PCIe host controller driver (Subrahmanya Lingappa)
- add Mobiveil MSI support (Subrahmanya Lingappa)
- clean up clocks, MSI, IRQ mappings in R-Car probe failure paths
(Marek Vasut)
- poll more frequently (5us vs 5ms) while waiting for R-Car data link
active (Marek Vasut)
- use generic OF parsing interface in R-Car (Vladimir Zapolskiy)
- add R-Car V3H (R8A77980) "compatible" string (Sergei Shtylyov)
- add R-Car gen3 PHY support (Sergei Shtylyov)
- improve R-Car PHYRDY polling (Sergei Shtylyov)
- clean up R-Car macros (Marek Vasut)
- use runtime PM for R-Car controller clock (Dien Pham)
- update arm64 defconfig for Rockchip (Shawn Lin)
- refactor Rockchip code to facilitate both root port and endpoint
mode (Shawn Lin)
- add Rockchip endpoint mode driver (Shawn Lin)
- support VMD "membar shadow" feature (Jon Derrick)
- support VMD bus number offsets (Jon Derrick)
- add VMD "no AER source ID" quirk for more device IDs (Jon Derrick)
- remove unnecessary host controller CONFIG_PCIEPORTBUS Kconfig
selections (Bjorn Helgaas)
- clean up quirks.c organization and whitespace (Bjorn Helgaas)
* tag 'pci-v4.18-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci: (144 commits)
PCI/AER: Replace struct pcie_device with pci_dev
PCI/AER: Remove unused parameters
PCI: qcom: Include gpio/consumer.h
PCI: Improve "partially hidden behind bridge" log message
PCI: Improve pci_scan_bridge() and pci_scan_bridge_extend() doc
PCI: Move resource distribution for single bridge outside loop
PCI: Account for all bridges on bus when distributing bus numbers
ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Drop unnecessary parentheses
ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Mark stale PCI devices disconnected
ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Don't scan bridges managed by native hotplug
PCI: hotplug: Add hotplug_is_native()
PCI: shpchp: Add shpchp_is_native()
PCI: shpchp: Fix AMD POGO identification
PCI: mobiveil: Add MSI support
PCI: mobiveil: Add Mobiveil PCIe Host Bridge IP driver
PCI/AER: Decode Error Source Requester ID
PCI/AER: Remove aer_recover_work_func() forward declaration
PCI/DPC: Use the generic pcie_do_fatal_recovery() path
PCI/AER: Pass service type to pcie_do_fatal_recovery()
PCI/DPC: Disable ERR_NONFATAL handling by DPC
...
|
|
The apparmor information in the apparmor.rst file is out of date.
Update it to the correct git reference for the master apparmor tree.
Update the wiki location to use apparmor.net which forwards to the
current wiki location on gitlab.com. Update user space tools address
to gitlab.com.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty
Pull tty/serial updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big tty/serial driver update for 4.18-rc1.
There's nothing major here, just lots of serial driver updates. Full
details are in the shortlog, nothing anything specific to call out
here.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues"
* tag 'tty-4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (55 commits)
vt: Perform safe console erase only once
serial: imx: disable UCR4_OREN on shutdown
serial: imx: drop CTS/RTS handling from shutdown
tty: fix typo in ASYNCB_FOURPORT comment
serial: samsung: check DMA engine capabilities before using DMA mode
tty: Fix data race in tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag
tty: serial: msm_geni_serial: Fix TX infinite loop
serial: 8250_dw: Fix runtime PM handling
serial: 8250: omap: Fix idling of clocks for unused uarts
tty: serial: drop ATH79 specific SoC symbols
serial: 8250: Add missing rxtrig_bytes on Altera 16550 UART
serial/aspeed-vuart: fix a couple mod_timer() calls
serial: sh-sci: Use spin_{try}lock_irqsave instead of open coding version
serial: 8250_of: Add IO space support
tty/serial: atmel: use port->name as name in request_irq()
serial: imx: dma_unmap_sg buffers on shutdown
serial: imx: cleanup imx_uart_disable_dma()
tty: serial: qcom_geni_serial: Add early console support
tty: serial: qcom_geni_serial: Return IRQ_NONE for spurious interrupts
tty: serial: qcom_geni_serial: Use iowrite32_rep to write to FIFO
...
|
Josh Poimboeuf
Tim Chen
Diana Craciun
Tyler Hicks
speck for Pawan Gupta
Thomas Gleixner
Salvatore Bonaccorso
Will Deacon
Kai-Heng Feng
Feng Tang
Paolo Bonzini
Tony Luck
Jiri Kosina
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Laurentiu Tudor
Rafael J. Wysocki
Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Linus Torvalds
Tejun Heo
Roman Gushchin
Jordan Glover