Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
commit 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac upstream.
Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
Spectre v1.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8 upstream.
Intel provided the following information:
On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
speculatively written segment value.
That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[PG: drop HYGON chunk - doesn't exist in 4.18.x kernels.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 64dbc122b20f75183d8822618c24f85144a5a94d upstream.
Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ
instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some
assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP
when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For
some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot.
Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended.
Fixes: 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream.
The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled. Enable those features where applicable.
The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".
There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:
- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can
write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
handler:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2
If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.
Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible
because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
accesses.
NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
doesn't exist quite yet.
- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the
gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
needs to be read from user space first. Something like:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
mov (%reg1), %reg2
// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3
It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without
tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.
Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:
- If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively
disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.
- If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably
only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.
Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.
Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.
[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream.
Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any
conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in
the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
GS.
For example:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
mov (%reg), %reg1
When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can
speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which
uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
attack.
A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
of the speculative window.
The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
isn't user-controlled; and
b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
"from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
above).
The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
lfences can be skipped in those cases.
On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
features for alternative patching:
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.
The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit acec0ce081de0c36459eea91647faf99296445a3 upstream.
It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
added in word 11 in the future.
Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
Linux-defined leaf.
Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.
Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
code into a separate function.
KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 45fc56e629caa451467e7664fbd4c797c434a6c4 upstream.
... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a
patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical,
sole code movement separate for easy review.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6e88559470f581741bcd0f2794f9054814ac9740 upstream.
Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs files
Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 26cb1f36c43ee6e89d2a9f48a5a7500d5248f836 upstream.
Currently only supported on powerpc.
Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 upstream.
A recent change moved the microcode loader hotplug callback into the early
startup phase which is running with interrupts disabled. It missed that
the callbacks invoke sysfs functions which might sleep causing nice 'might
sleep' splats with proper debugging enabled.
Split the callbacks and only load the microcode in the early startup phase
and move the sysfs handling back into the later threaded and preemptible
bringup phase where it was before.
Fixes: 78f4e932f776 ("x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906182228350.1766@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
|
|
commit 0354c1a3cdf31f44b035cfad14d32282e815a572 upstream.
While this doesn't actually amount to a real difference, since the macro
evaluates to the same thing, every place else operates on ktime_t using
these functions, so let's not break the pattern.
Fixes: e3ff9c3678b4 ("timekeeping: Repair ktime_get_coarse*() granularity")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190621203249.3909-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
|
|
commit 34632975cafdd07ce80e85c2eda4e9c16b5f2faa upstream.
DEV_ADDR is defined but not used. Use it in address setting.
Do the same with IPv6 for consistency.
Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Fixes: fc82d93e57e3 ("selftests: fib_rule_tests: fix local IPv4 address typo")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
commit cf47a0b882a4e5f6b34c7949d7b293e9287f1972 upstream.
syzkaller reports for memory leak when registering hooks [1]
As we moved the nf_unregister_net_hooks() call into
__ip_vs_dev_cleanup(), defer the nf_register_net_hooks()
call, so that hooks are allocated and freed from same
pernet_operations (ipvs_core_dev_ops).
[1]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810acd8a80 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor073", pid 7254, jiffies 4294950560 (age 22.250s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 8b bb 82 ff ff ff ff ........P.......
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 77 bb 82 ff ff ff ff .........w......
backtrace:
[<0000000013db61f1>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline]
[<0000000013db61f1>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<0000000013db61f1>] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3269 [inline]
[<0000000013db61f1>] kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x15b/0x2a0 mm/slab.c:3597
[<000000001a27307d>] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3619 [inline]
[<000000001a27307d>] __kmalloc_node+0x38/0x50 mm/slab.c:3627
[<0000000025054add>] kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline]
[<0000000025054add>] kvmalloc_node+0x4a/0xd0 mm/util.c:431
[<0000000050d1bc00>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:637 [inline]
[<0000000050d1bc00>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:645 [inline]
[<0000000050d1bc00>] allocate_hook_entries_size+0x3b/0x60 net/netfilter/core.c:61
[<00000000e8abe142>] nf_hook_entries_grow+0xae/0x270 net/netfilter/core.c:128
[<000000004b94797c>] __nf_register_net_hook+0x9a/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:337
[<00000000d1545cbc>] nf_register_net_hook+0x34/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:464
[<00000000876c9b55>] nf_register_net_hooks+0x53/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:480
[<000000002ea868e0>] __ip_vs_init+0xe8/0x170 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c:2280
[<000000002eb2d451>] ops_init+0x4c/0x140 net/core/net_namespace.c:130
[<000000000284ec48>] setup_net+0xde/0x230 net/core/net_namespace.c:316
[<00000000a70600fa>] copy_net_ns+0xf0/0x1e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:439
[<00000000ff26c15e>] create_new_namespaces+0x141/0x2a0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000b103dc79>] copy_namespaces+0xa1/0xe0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<000000007cc008a2>] copy_process.part.0+0x11fd/0x2150 kernel/fork.c:2035
[<00000000c344af7c>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1800 [inline]
[<00000000c344af7c>] _do_fork+0x121/0x4f0 kernel/fork.c:2369
Reported-by: syzbot+722da59ccb264bc19910@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 719c7d563c17 ("ipvs: Fix use-after-free in ip_vs_in")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
commit 5d59aa8f9ce972b472201aed86e904bb75879ff0 upstream.
Since commit 54c7a8916a88 ("initramfs: free initrd memory if opening
/initrd.image fails"), the kernel has unconditionally attempted to free
the initrd even if it doesn't exist.
In the non-existent case this causes a boot-time splat if
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is enabled due to a call to virt_to_phys() with a
NULL address.
Instead we should check that the initrd actually exists and only attempt
to free it if it does.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190516143125.48948-1-steven.price@arm.com
Fixes: 54c7a8916a88 ("initramfs: free initrd memory if opening /initrd.image fails")
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[PG: adapt for older 4.18.x codebase with kexec if/else chunk.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
ftrace_call_replace()
commit 745cfeaac09ce359130a5451d90cb0bd4094c290 upstream.
Arnd reported the following compiler warning:
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:669:23: error: 'ftrace_jmp_replace' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function]
The ftrace_jmp_replace() function now only has a single user and should be
simply moved by that user. But looking at the code, it shows that
ftrace_jmp_replace() is similar to ftrace_call_replace() except that instead
of using the opcode of 0xe8 it uses 0xe9. It makes more sense to consolidate
that function into one implementation that both ftrace_jmp_replace() and
ftrace_call_replace() use by passing in the op code separate.
The structure in ftrace_code_union is also modified to replace the "e8"
field with the more appropriate name "op".
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190304200748.1418790-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: d2a68c4effd8 ("x86/ftrace: Do not call function graph from dynamic trampolines")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d6ed083f5cc621e15c15b56c3b585fd524dbcb0f upstream.
The bounds check used the uninitialized variable vaddr, it should use
the given parameter kaddr instead. When using the uninitialized value
the compiler assumed it to be 0 and optimized this function to just
return 0 in all cases.
This should make the function check the range of the given address and
only do the page map check in case it is in the expected range of
virtual addresses.
Fixes: 074a1e1167af ("MIPS: Bounds check virt_addr_valid")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
Cc: jhogan@kernel.org
Cc: f4bug@amsat.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ysu@wavecomp.com
Cc: jcristau@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 7cb95eeea6706c790571042a06782e378b2561ea upstream.
It turns out that while disabling i2c bus access from software when the
GPU is suspended was a step in the right direction with:
commit 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after
->fini()")
We also ended up accidentally breaking the vbios init scripts on some
older Tesla GPUs, as apparently said scripts can actually use the i2c
bus. Since these scripts are executed before initializing any
subdevices, we end up failing to acquire access to the i2c bus which has
left a number of cards with their fan controllers uninitialized. Luckily
this doesn't break hardware - it just means the fan gets stuck at 100%.
This also means that we've always been using our i2c busses before
initializing them during the init scripts for older GPUs, we just didn't
notice it until we started preventing them from being used until init.
It's pretty impressive this never caused us any issues before!
So, fix this by initializing our i2c pad and busses during subdev
pre-init. We skip initializing aux busses during pre-init, as those are
guaranteed to only ever be used by nouveau for DP aux transactions.
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marc Meledandri <m.meledandri@gmail.com>
Fixes: 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after ->fini()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit c358ebf59634f06d8ed176da651ec150df3c8686 upstream.
While I had thought I had fixed this issue in:
commit 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after
->fini()")
It turns out that while I did fix the error messages I was seeing on my
P50 when trying to access i2c busses with the GPU in runtime suspend, I
accidentally had missed one important detail that was mentioned on the
bug report this commit was supposed to fix: that the CPU would only lock
up when trying to access i2c busses _on connected devices_ _while the
GPU is not in runtime suspend_. Whoops. That definitely explains why I
was not able to get my machine to hang with i2c bus interactions until
now, as plugging my P50 into it's dock with an HDMI monitor connected
allowed me to finally reproduce this locally.
Now that I have managed to reproduce this issue properly, it looks like
the problem is much simpler then it looks. It turns out that some
connected devices, such as MST laptop docks, will actually ACK i2c reads
even if no data was actually read:
[ 275.063043] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: 1: 0000004c 1
[ 275.063447] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: 00 01101000 10040000
[ 275.063759] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000001
[ 275.064024] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000
[ 275.064285] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000
[ 275.064594] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000
Because we don't handle the situation of i2c ack without any data, we
end up entering an infinite loop in nvkm_i2c_aux_i2c_xfer() since the
value of cnt always remains at 0. This finally properly explains how
this could result in a CPU hang like the ones observed in the
aforementioned commit.
So, fix this by retrying transactions if no data is written or received,
and give up and fail the transaction if we continue to not write or
receive any data after 32 retries.
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit dd80857bf388abd0c64dd3aa4fbf7d407deba819 upstream.
Prior to reloading a device we must first verify that it was not already
removed. Otherwise, the attempt to remove the device will do nothing, and
in that case we will end up proceeding with adding an new device that no
one was expecting to remove, leaving behind used resources such as EQs that
causes a failure to destroy comp EQs and syndrome (0x30f433).
Fix that by making sure that we try to remove and add a device (based on a
protocol) only if the device is already added.
Fixes: c5447c70594b ("net/mlx5: E-Switch, Reload IB interface when switching devlink modes")
Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel <alaa@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit f69e749a49353d96af1a293f56b5b56de59c668a upstream.
file_remove_privs() might be called for non-regular files, e.g.
blkdev inode. There is no reason to do its job on things
like blkdev inodes, pipes, or cdevs. Hence, abort if
file does not refer to a regular inode.
AV: more to the point, for devices there might be any number of
inodes refering to given device. Which one to strip the permissions
from, even if that made any sense in the first place? All of them
will be observed with contents modified, after all.
Found by LockDoc (Alexander Lochmann, Horst Schirmeier and Olaf
Spinczyk)
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lochmann <alexander.lochmann@tu-dortmund.de>
Signed-off-by: Horst Schirmeier <horst.schirmeier@tu-dortmund.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 59ea6d06cfa9247b586a695c21f94afa7183af74 upstream.
When fixing the race conditions between the coredump and the mmap_sem
holders outside the context of the process, we focused on
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() callers in 04f5866e41fb70 ("coredump: fix
race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core
dumping"), but those aren't the only cases where the mmap_sem can be
taken outside of the context of the process as Michal Hocko noticed
while backporting that commit to older -stable kernels.
If mmgrab() is called in the context of the process, but then the
mm_count reference is transferred outside the context of the process,
that can also be a problem if the mmap_sem has to be taken for writing
through that mm_count reference.
khugepaged registration calls mmgrab() in the context of the process,
but the mmap_sem for writing is taken later in the context of the
khugepaged kernel thread.
collapse_huge_page() after taking the mmap_sem for writing doesn't
modify any vma, so it's not obvious that it could cause a problem to the
coredump, but it happens to modify the pmd in a way that breaks an
invariant that pmd_trans_huge_lock() relies upon. collapse_huge_page()
needs the mmap_sem for writing just to block concurrent page faults that
call pmd_trans_huge_lock().
Specifically the invariant that "!pmd_trans_huge()" cannot become a
"pmd_trans_huge()" doesn't hold while collapse_huge_page() runs.
The coredump will call __get_user_pages() without mmap_sem for reading,
which eventually can invoke a lockless page fault which will need a
functional pmd_trans_huge_lock().
So collapse_huge_page() needs to use mmget_still_valid() to check it's
not running concurrently with the coredump... as long as the coredump
can invoke page faults without holding the mmap_sem for reading.
This has "Fixes: khugepaged" to facilitate backporting, but in my view
it's more a bug in the coredump code that will eventually have to be
rewritten to stop invoking page faults without the mmap_sem for reading.
So the long term plan is still to drop all mmget_still_valid().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190607161558.32104-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ba76149f47d8 ("thp: khugepaged")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit b9fba67b3806e21b98bd5a98dc3921a8e9b42d61 upstream.
If a call to kobject_init_and_add() fails we should call kobject_put()
otherwise we leak memory.
Add call to kobject_put() in the error path of call to
kobject_init_and_add(). Please note, this has the side effect that the
release method is called if kobject_init_and_add() fails.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190513033458.2824-1-tobin@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 275e928f19117d22f6d26dee94548baf4041b773 upstream.
Force of 56G is not supported by hardware in Ethernet devices. This
configuration fails with a bad parameter error from firmware.
Add check of this case. Instead of trying to set 56G with autoneg off,
return a meaningful error.
Fixes: 56ade8fe3fe1 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Add initial support for Spectrum ASIC")
Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amitc@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 3b0541791453fbe7f42867e310e0c9eb6295364d upstream.
The sas_port(phy->port) allocated in sas_ex_discover_expander() will not be
deleted when the expander failed to discover. This will cause resource leak
and a further issue of kernel BUG like below:
[159785.843156] port-2:17:29: trying to add phy phy-2:17:29 fails: it's
already part of another port
[159785.852144] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[159785.856833] kernel BUG at drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c:1086!
[159785.863000] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
[159785.867866] CPU: 39 PID: 16993 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Tainted: G
W OE 4.19.25-vhulk1901.1.0.h111.aarch64 #1
[159785.878458] Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Hi1620EVBCS/Hi1620EVBCS, BIOS Hi1620 CS B070 1P TA 03/21/2019
[159785.889231] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_disco_q sas_discover_domain
[159785.895224] pstate: 40c00009 (nZcv daif +PAN +UAO)
[159785.900094] pc : sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8
[159785.904524] lr : sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8
[159785.908952] sp : ffff0001120e3b80
[159785.912341] x29: ffff0001120e3b80 x28: 0000000000000000
[159785.917727] x27: ffff802ade8f5400 x26: ffff0000681b7560
[159785.923111] x25: ffff802adf11a800 x24: ffff0000680e8000
[159785.928496] x23: ffff802ade8f5728 x22: ffff802ade8f5708
[159785.933880] x21: ffff802adea2db40 x20: ffff802ade8f5400
[159785.939264] x19: ffff802adea2d800 x18: 0000000000000010
[159785.944649] x17: 00000000821bf734 x16: ffff00006714faa0
[159785.950033] x15: ffff0000e8ab4ecf x14: 7261702079646165
[159785.955417] x13: 726c612073277469 x12: ffff00006887b830
[159785.960802] x11: ffff00006773eaa0 x10: 7968702079687020
[159785.966186] x9 : 0000000000002453 x8 : 726f702072656874
[159785.971570] x7 : 6f6e6120666f2074 x6 : ffff802bcfb21290
[159785.976955] x5 : ffff802bcfb21290 x4 : 0000000000000000
[159785.982339] x3 : ffff802bcfb298c8 x2 : 337752b234c2ab00
[159785.987723] x1 : 337752b234c2ab00 x0 : 0000000000000000
[159785.993108] Process kworker/u96:2 (pid: 16993, stack limit =
0x0000000072dae094)
[159786.000576] Call trace:
[159786.003097] sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8
[159786.007179] sas_ex_get_linkrate.isra.5+0x134/0x140
[159786.012130] sas_ex_discover_expander+0x128/0x408
[159786.016906] sas_ex_discover_dev+0x218/0x4c8
[159786.021249] sas_ex_discover_devices+0x9c/0x1a8
[159786.025852] sas_discover_root_expander+0x134/0x160
[159786.030802] sas_discover_domain+0x1b8/0x1e8
[159786.035148] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x3f8
[159786.039230] worker_thread+0x54/0x470
[159786.042967] kthread+0x134/0x138
[159786.046269] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[159786.049918] Code: 91322300 f0004402 91178042 97fe4c9b (d4210000)
[159786.056083] Modules linked in: hns3_enet_ut(OE) hclge(OE) hnae3(OE)
hisi_sas_test_hw(OE) hisi_sas_test_main(OE) serdes(OE)
[159786.067202] ---[ end trace 03622b9e2d99e196 ]---
[159786.071893] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[159786.077190] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[159786.081192] Kernel Offset: disabled
[159786.084753] CPU features: 0x2,a2a00a38
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Reported-by: Jian Luo <luojian5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 12e750bc62044de096ab9a95201213fd912b9994 upstream.
If alloc_workqueue fails in alua_init, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise
it will trigger null-ptr-deref while unloading module which calls
destroy_workqueue dereference
wq->lock like this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000080 by task syz-executor.0/7045
CPU: 0 PID: 7045 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0+ #28
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e
__kasan_report+0x171/0x18d
? __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0
kasan_report+0xe/0x20
__lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0
lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1b0
__mutex_lock+0xd8/0xb90
drain_workqueue+0x25/0x290
destroy_workqueue+0x1f/0x3f0
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x244/0x330
do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 03197b61c5ec ("scsi_dh_alua: Use workqueue for RTPG")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1d94f06e7f5df4064ef336b7b710f50143b64a53 upstream.
When SME is enabled, the smartpqi driver won't work on the HP DL385 G10
machine, which causes the failure of kernel boot because it fails to
allocate pqi error buffer. Please refer to the kernel log:
....
[ 9.431749] usbcore: registered new interface driver uas
[ 9.441524] Microsemi PQI Driver (v1.1.4-130)
[ 9.442956] i40e 0000:04:00.0: fw 6.70.48768 api 1.7 nvm 10.2.5
[ 9.447237] smartpqi 0000:23:00.0: Microsemi Smart Family Controller found
Starting dracut initqueue hook...
[ OK ] Started Show Plymouth Boot Scre[ 9.471654] Broadcom NetXtreme-C/E driver bnxt_en v1.9.1
en.
[ OK ] Started Forward Password Requests to Plymouth Directory Watch.
[[0;[ 9.487108] smartpqi 0000:23:00.0: failed to allocate PQI error buffer
....
[ 139.050544] dracut-initqueue[949]: Warning: dracut-initqueue timeout - starting timeout scripts
[ 139.589779] dracut-initqueue[949]: Warning: dracut-initqueue timeout - starting timeout scripts
Basically, the fact that the coherent DMA mask value wasn't set caused the
driver to fall back to SWIOTLB when SME is active.
For correct operation, lets call the dma_set_mask_and_coherent() to
properly set the mask for both streaming and coherent, in order to inform
the kernel about the devices DMA addressing capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Tested-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit cc555759117e8349088e0c5d19f2f2a500bafdbd upstream.
ip_dev_find() can return NULL so add a check for NULL pointer.
Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 2b892649254fec01678c64f16427622b41fa27f4 upstream.
PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_RXID is less then TXID
so code to set tx delay is never called.
Fixes: 2a10154abcb75 ("net: phy: dp83867: Add TI dp83867 phy")
Signed-off-by: Max Uvarov <muvarov@gmail.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit c678726305b9425454be7c8a7624290b602602fc upstream.
Ensure that we supply the same phy interface mode to mac_link_down() as
we did for the corresponding mac_link_up() call. This ensures that MAC
drivers that use the phy interface mode in these methods can depend on
mac_link_down() always corresponding to a mac_link_up() call for the
same interface mode.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 315ca92dd863fecbffc0bb52ae0ac11e0398726a upstream.
The sh_eth_close() resets the MAC and then calls phy_stop()
so that mdio read access result is incorrect without any error
according to kernel trace like below:
ifconfig-216 [003] .n.. 109.133124: mdio_access: ee700000.ethernet-ffffffff read phy:0x01 reg:0x00 val:0xffff
According to the hardware manual, the RMII mode should be set to 1
before operation the Ethernet MAC. However, the previous code was not
set to 1 after the driver issued the soft_reset in sh_eth_dev_exit()
so that the mdio read access result seemed incorrect. To fix the issue,
this patch adds a condition and set the RMII mode register in
sh_eth_dev_exit() for R-Car Gen2 and RZ/A1 SoCs.
Note that when I have tried to move the sh_eth_dev_exit() calling
after phy_stop() on sh_eth_close(), but it gets worse (kernel panic
happened and it seems that a register is accessed while the clock is
off).
Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 5a3f49364c3ffa1107bd88f8292406e98c5d206c upstream.
Currently the HV KVM code takes the kvm->lock around calls to
kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() (which can call
kvm_for_each_vcpu() internally). However, that leads to a lock
order inversion problem, because these are called in contexts where
the vcpu mutex is held, but the vcpu mutexes nest within kvm->lock
according to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt. Hence there
is a possibility of deadlock.
To fix this, we simply don't take the kvm->lock mutex around these
calls. This is safe because the implementations of kvm_for_each_vcpu()
and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() have been designed to be able to be called
locklessly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1659e27d2bc1ef47b6d031abe01b467f18cb72d9 upstream.
Currently the Book 3S KVM code uses kvm->lock to synchronize access
to the kvm->arch.rtas_tokens list. Because this list is scanned
inside kvmppc_rtas_hcall(), which is called with the vcpu mutex held,
taking kvm->lock cause a lock inversion problem, which could lead to
a deadlock.
To fix this, we add a new mutex, kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock, which nests
inside the vcpu mutexes, and use that instead of kvm->lock when
accessing the rtas token list.
This removes the lockdep_assert_held() in kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free().
At this point we don't hold the new mutex, but that is OK because
kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free() is only called when the whole VM is being
destroyed, and at that point nothing can be looking up a token in
the list.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit d10e0cc113c9e1b64b5c6e3db37b5c839794f3df upstream.
During a suspend/resume, the xenwatch thread waits for all outstanding
xenstore requests and transactions to complete. This does not work
correctly for transactions started by userspace because it waits for
them to complete after freezing userspace threads which means the
transactions have no way of completing, resulting in a deadlock. This is
trivial to reproduce by running this script and then suspending the VM:
import pyxs, time
c = pyxs.client.Client(xen_bus_path="/dev/xen/xenbus")
c.connect()
c.transaction()
time.sleep(3600)
Even if this deadlock were resolved, misbehaving userspace should not
prevent a VM from being migrated. So, instead of waiting for these
transactions to complete before suspending, store the current generation
id for each transaction when it is started. The global generation id is
incremented during resume. If the caller commits the transaction and the
generation id does not match the current generation id, return EAGAIN so
that they try again. If the transaction was instead discarded, return OK
since no changes were made anyway.
This only affects users of the xenbus file interface. In-kernel users of
xenbus are assumed to be well-behaved and complete all transactions
before freezing.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 41349672e3cbc2e8349831f21253509c3415aa2b upstream.
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_sendmsg:
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:543:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_recvmsg:
drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:638:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
They are never used since introduction.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 9a626c4a6326da4433a0d4d4a8a7d1571caf1ed3 upstream.
Fix build errors on ia64 when DISCONTIGMEM=y and NUMA=y by
exporting paddr_to_nid().
Fixes these build errors:
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [sound/core/snd-pcm.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [net/sunrpc/sunrpc.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [fs/cifs/cifs.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/mon/usbmon.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/core/usbcore.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/raid1.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-mod.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-crypt.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-bufio.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-core.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-cd_mod.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/gpu/drm/drm.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/char/agp/agpgart.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/nbd.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/loop.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/brd.ko] undefined!
ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [crypto/ccm.ko] undefined!
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6738028dd57df064b969d8392c943ef3b3ae705d upstream.
Command 'perf record' and 'perf report' on a system without kernel
debuginfo packages uses /proc/kallsyms and /proc/modules to find
addresses for kernel and module symbols. On x86 this works for root and
non-root users.
On s390, when invoked as non-root user, many of the following warnings
are shown and module symbols are missing:
proc/{kallsyms,modules} inconsistency while looking for
"[sha1_s390]" module!
Command 'perf record' creates a list of module start addresses by
parsing the output of /proc/modules and creates a PERF_RECORD_MMAP
record for the kernel and each module. The following function call
sequence is executed:
machine__create_kernel_maps
machine__create_module
modules__parse
machine__create_module --> for each line in /proc/modules
arch__fix_module_text_start
Function arch__fix_module_text_start() is s390 specific. It opens
file /sys/module/<name>/sections/.text to extract the module's .text
section start address. On s390 the module loader prepends a header
before the first section, whereas on x86 the module's text section
address is identical the the module's load address.
However module section files are root readable only. For non-root the
read operation fails and machine__create_module() returns an error.
Command perf record does not generate any PERF_RECORD_MMAP record
for loaded modules. Later command perf report complains about missing
module maps.
To fix this function arch__fix_module_text_start() always returns
success. For root users there is no change, for non-root users
the module's load address is used as module's text start address
(the prepended header then counts as part of the text section).
This enable non-root users to use module symbols and avoid the
warning when perf report is executed.
Output before:
[tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP
0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text
Output after:
[tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP
0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text
0 0x1b8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../autofs4.ko.xz
0 0x250 [0xa8]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../sha_common.ko.xz
0 0x2f8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../des_generic.ko.xz
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522144601.50763-4-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 6584140ba9e6762dd7ec73795243289b914f31f9 upstream.
It seems that the current code lacks holding the namespace lock in
thread__namespaces(). Otherwise it can see inconsistent results.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522053250.207156-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 97acec7df172cd1e450f81f5e293c0aa145a2797 upstream.
This strncat() is safe because the buffer was allocated with zalloc(),
however gcc doesn't know that. Since the string always has 4 non-null
bytes, just use memcpy() here.
CC /home/shawn/linux/tools/perf/util/data-convert-bt.o
In file included from /usr/include/string.h:494,
from /home/shawn/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.h:27,
from util/data-convert-bt.c:22:
In function ‘strncat’,
inlined from ‘string_set_value’ at util/data-convert-bt.c:274:4:
/usr/include/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:136:10: error: ‘__builtin_strncat’ output may be truncated copying 4 bytes from a string of length 4 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
136 | return __builtin___strncat_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
LPU-Reference: 20190518183238.10954-1-shawn@git.icu
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-289f1jice17ta7tr3tstm9jm@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit f6122ed2a4f9c9c1c073ddf6308d1b2ac10e0781 upstream.
In the vfs_statx() context, during path lookup, the dentry gets
added to sd->s_dentry via configfs_attach_attr(). In the end,
vfs_statx() kills the dentry by calling path_put(), which invokes
configfs_d_iput(). Ideally, this dentry must be removed from
sd->s_dentry but it doesn't if the sd->s_count >= 3. As a result,
sd->s_dentry is holding reference to a stale dentry pointer whose
memory is already freed up. This results in use-after-free issue,
when this stale sd->s_dentry is accessed later in
configfs_readdir() path.
This issue can be easily reproduced, by running the LTP test case -
sh fs_racer_file_list.sh /config
(https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/fs/racer/fs_racer_file_list.sh)
Fixes: 76ae281f6307 ('configfs: fix race between dentry put and lookup')
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit fa763f1b2858752e6150ffff46886a1b7faffc82 upstream.
We observed the same issue as reported by commit a8d7bde23e7130686b7662
("ALSA: hda - Force polling mode on CFL for fixing codec communication")
We don't have a better solution. So apply the same workaround to CNL.
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit a0692f0eef91354b62c2b4c94954536536be5425 upstream.
If I2C_M_RECV_LEN check failed, msgs[i].buf allocated by memdup_user
will not be freed. Pump index up so it will be freed.
Fixes: 838bfa6049fb ("i2c-dev: Add support for I2C_M_RECV_LEN")
Signed-off-by: Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit eaeb3b7494ba9159323814a8ce8af06a9277d99b upstream.
Driver stops producing skbs on ring if a packet with FCS error
was coalesced into LRO session. Ring gets hang forever.
Thats a logical error in driver processing descriptors:
When rx_stat indicates MAC Error, next pointer and eop flags
are not filled. This confuses driver so it waits for descriptor 0
to be filled by HW.
Solution is fill next pointer and eop flag even for packets with FCS error.
Fixes: bab6de8fd180b ("net: ethernet: aquantia: Atlantic A0 and B0 specific functions.")
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <igor.russkikh@aquantia.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dmitry.bogdanov@aquantia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 31bafc49a7736989e4c2d9f7280002c66536e590 upstream.
In case no other traffic happening on the ring, full tx cleanup
may not be completed. That may cause socket buffer to overflow
and tx traffic to stuck until next activity on the ring happens.
This is due to logic error in budget variable decrementor.
Variable is compared with zero, and then post decremented,
causing it to become MAX_INT. Solution is remove decrementor
from the `for` statement and rewrite it in a clear way.
Fixes: b647d3980948e ("net: aquantia: Add tx clean budget and valid budget handling logic")
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <igor.russkikh@aquantia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 1396500d673bd027683a0609ff84dca7eb6ea2e7 upstream.
The devcoredump needs to operate on a stable state of the MMU while
it is writing the MMU state to the coredump. The missing lock
allowed both the userspace submit, as well as the GPU job finish
paths to mutate the MMU state while a coredump is under way.
Fixes: a8c21a5451d8 (drm/etnaviv: add initial etnaviv DRM driver)
Reported-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl>
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: David Jander <david@protonic.nl>
Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 9a51c6b1f9e0239a9435db036b212498a2a3b75c upstream.
Both acpi_pci_need_resume() and acpi_dev_needs_resume() check if the
current ACPI wakeup configuration of the device matches what is
expected as far as system wakeup from sleep states is concerned, as
reflected by the device_may_wakeup() return value for the device.
However, they only should do that if wakeup.flags.valid is set for
the device's ACPI companion, because otherwise the wakeup.prepare_count
value for it is meaningless.
Add the missing wakeup.flags.valid checks to these functions.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 3e66b7cc50ef921121babc91487e1fb98af1ba6e upstream.
Building with Clang reports the redundant use of MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE():
drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c:2110:1: error: redefinition of '__mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table'
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(eisa, de4x5_eisa_ids);
^
./include/linux/module.h:229:21: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
extern typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \
^
<scratch space>:90:1: note: expanded from here
__mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table
^
drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/de4x5.c:2100:1: note: previous definition is here
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(eisa, de4x5_eisa_ids);
^
./include/linux/module.h:229:21: note: expanded from macro 'MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE'
extern typeof(name) __mod_##type##__##name##_device_table \
^
<scratch space>:85:1: note: expanded from here
__mod_eisa__de4x5_eisa_ids_device_table
^
This drops the one further from the table definition to match the common
use of MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE().
Fixes: 07563c711fbc ("EISA bus MODALIAS attributes support")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 4523a5611526709ec9b4e2574f1bb7818212651e upstream.
Currently we will not update the receive descriptor tail pointer in
stmmac_rx_refill. Rx dma will think no available descriptors and stop
once received packets exceed DMA_RX_SIZE, so that the rx only test will fail.
Update the receive tail pointer in stmmac_rx_refill to add more descriptors
to the rx channel, so packets can be received continually
Fixes: 54139cf3bb33 ("net: stmmac: adding multiple buffers for rx")
Signed-off-by: Biao Huang <biao.huang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit e9646f0f5bb62b7d43f0968f39d536cfe7123b53 upstream.
The gpio-adp5588 driver uses interfaces that are provided by
GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP, so select that symbol in its Kconfig entry.
Fixes these build errors:
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c: In function ‘adp5588_irq_handler’:
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:266:26: error: ‘struct gpio_chip’ has no member named ‘irq’
dev->gpio_chip.irq.domain, gpio));
^
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c: In function ‘adp5588_irq_setup’:
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:298:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘gpiochip_irqchip_add_nested’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
ret = gpiochip_irqchip_add_nested(&dev->gpio_chip,
^
../drivers/gpio/gpio-adp5588.c:307:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘gpiochip_set_nested_irqchip’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
gpiochip_set_nested_irqchip(&dev->gpio_chip,
^
Fixes: 459773ae8dbb ("gpio: adp5588-gpio: support interrupt controller")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com>
Acked-by: Michael Hennerich <michael.hennerich@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
commit 4d839dd9e4356bbacf3eb0ab13a549b83b008c21 upstream.
We must use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() on rb->user_page data such that
concurrent usage will see whole values. A few key sites were missing
this.
Suggested-by: Yabin Cui <yabinc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com
Cc: namhyung@kernel.org
Fixes: 7b732a750477 ("perf_counter: new output ABI - part 1")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190517115418.394192145@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|