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Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/ip6_input.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/ip6_input.c33
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
index acf0749ee5bb..2bdb03a45baf 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
@@ -47,18 +47,25 @@
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
#include <net/dst_metadata.h>
+void udp_v6_early_demux(struct sk_buff *);
+void tcp_v6_early_demux(struct sk_buff *);
static void ip6_rcv_finish_core(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- void (*edemux)(struct sk_buff *skb);
-
- if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux && !skb_dst(skb) && skb->sk == NULL) {
- const struct inet6_protocol *ipprot;
-
- ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet6_protos[ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr]);
- if (ipprot && (edemux = READ_ONCE(ipprot->early_demux)))
- edemux(skb);
+ if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux) &&
+ !skb_dst(skb) && !skb->sk) {
+ switch (ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux))
+ tcp_v6_early_demux(skb);
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux))
+ udp_v6_early_demux(skb);
+ break;
+ }
}
+
if (!skb_valid_dst(skb))
ip6_route_input(skb);
}
@@ -222,16 +229,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
goto err;
- /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
- * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
- * model can not deal properly with these.
- * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
- *
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
- */
- if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
- goto err;
-
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);