diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_event.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 21e5913d12e0..640c54ec1bd2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static void hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* wake_up_bit advises about this barrier */ wake_up_bit(&hdev->flags, HCI_INQUIRY); + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + hci_discovery_set_state(hdev, DISCOVERY_STOPPED); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + hci_conn_check_pending(hdev); } @@ -3537,7 +3541,11 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) cp.authentication = conn->auth_type; /* Request MITM protection if our IO caps allow it - * except for the no-bonding case + * except for the no-bonding case. + * conn->auth_type is not updated here since + * that might cause the user confirmation to be + * rejected in case the remote doesn't have the + * IO capabilities for MITM. */ if (conn->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT && cp.authentication != HCI_AT_NO_BONDING) @@ -3628,8 +3636,11 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, /* If we're not the initiators request authorization to * proceed from user space (mgmt_user_confirm with - * confirm_hint set to 1). */ - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags)) { + * confirm_hint set to 1). The exception is if neither + * side had MITM in which case we do auto-accept. + */ + if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND, &conn->flags) && + (loc_mitm || rem_mitm)) { BT_DBG("Confirming auto-accept as acceptor"); confirm_hint = 1; goto confirm; |