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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c12
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
index ec6b7ad70659..74b3a03a578e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static bool bad_kernel_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
// Read/write fault in a valid region (the exception table search passed
// above), but blocked by KUAP is bad, it can never succeed.
- if (bad_kuap_fault(regs, is_write))
+ if (bad_kuap_fault(regs, address, is_write))
return true;
// What's left? Kernel fault on user in well defined regions (extable
@@ -262,6 +262,9 @@ static bool bad_kernel_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
return false;
}
+// This comes from 64-bit struct rt_sigframe + __SIGNAL_FRAMESIZE
+#define SIGFRAME_MAX_SIZE (4096 + 128)
+
static bool bad_stack_expansion(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int flags,
bool *must_retry)
@@ -269,7 +272,7 @@ static bool bad_stack_expansion(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
/*
* N.B. The POWER/Open ABI allows programs to access up to
* 288 bytes below the stack pointer.
- * The kernel signal delivery code writes up to about 1.5kB
+ * The kernel signal delivery code writes a bit over 4KB
* below the stack pointer (r1) before decrementing it.
* The exec code can write slightly over 640kB to the stack
* before setting the user r1. Thus we allow the stack to
@@ -294,7 +297,7 @@ static bool bad_stack_expansion(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
* between the last mapped region and the stack will
* expand the stack rather than segfaulting.
*/
- if (address + 2048 >= uregs->gpr[1])
+ if (address + SIGFRAME_MAX_SIZE >= uregs->gpr[1])
return false;
if ((flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && (flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) &&
@@ -375,6 +378,9 @@ static void sanity_check_fault(bool is_write, bool is_user,
* Userspace trying to access kernel address, we get PROTFAULT for that.
*/
if (is_user && address >= TASK_SIZE) {
+ if ((long)address == -1)
+ return;
+
pr_crit_ratelimited("%s[%d]: User access of kernel address (%lx) - exploit attempt? (uid: %d)\n",
current->comm, current->pid, address,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()));