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The PSEUDO_SUFFIX thing is an installation quirk to allow our
build system to tag libpseudo.so with a checksum of the host libc.
However, we reuse a prebuilt pseudo server with the new pseudo
libraries; this means that encoding the suffix in the environment
hackery is a Bad Idea.
Update version number to 0.3, since this seems to wrap up a
hunk of development effort.
The PSEUDO_DEBUG_FILE feature is enhanced, and is now also used by the
Address a couple of compiler warnings, add a couple of signals to the
list of caught signals, etcetera.
You can't use setenv() to modify the environment that will
be passed to a child process through execve()...
Also, fix the setupenv() to use PSEUDO_SUFFIX if defined.
Use execve() to spawn child processes, so we can use setupenv()
* Add lckpwdf/ulckpwdf to guts/README
* Remove arguments from function pointer arguments.
While in theory the compar function pointer has always taken
"const struct dirent **", some systems (many) have declared
it instead as taking "const void *". For now, just omit
the types; a pointer to function taking unknown arguments
is a compatible type, and we never call the functions, we
just pass them to something else.
* Handle readlinkat() on systems without *at functions
* Fix pseudo_etc_file (spotted by "fortify")
When O_CREAT can be a flag, 0600 mode is needed. While we're
at it, remove a bogus dummy open.
* Fix mkdtemp()
Was returning the address of the internal buffer rather than the
user-provided buffer. Also fixed a typo in an error message.
* Don't call fgetgrent_r() with a null FILE *.
* A couple of other typo-type fixes.
It's not enough to rely on the usual chroot() stuff affecting the
file open, not least because these use the glibc-internal __open
which is not currently intercepted, but also because we want to
use the PSEUDO_PASSWD path when that's set but there's no chroot().
There's some extra magic in pseudo_etc_file to support these
operations, since they can legitimately create a file rather
than opening an existing one.
Moved readlink fixup into a general-purpose function for
removing chroot prefixes.
Spotted some glibc extensions to file modes, altered fopen logic.
Fix handling for the case where the underlying pseudo_pwd_fd or
pseudo_grp_fd are closed.
This is a first pass at handling password/group calls, allowing
the use of custom password/group files. In particular, when
chroot()ed to a particular directory, pseudo picks files in
that directory by default, to improve support for the typical
use case where pseudo uses chroot() only to jump into a virtual
This allows us to track execution, although the tracking for it
requires some additional thought -- the basic assumption is that we
don't want to canonicalize names into the chroot() directory, but
since all the filename canonicalization assumes that we want this,
that will take some sneaking. It's a little useful as is, though,
so I'm running with it.
This patch adds support for checking whether a file was opened for
reading, writing, or both, as well as tracking append flags. It is
not very well tested. This is preparation for improved host
None of them seem to have been genuine problems, but it's prettier now,
and some were questionable.
Add chroot() and a large number of things needed to make it work.
The list of intercepted calls is large but not exhaustive.
* Improve makewrappers handling of function pointer arguments.
* Regenerate wrappers when makewrappers is touched.
* Move path resolution from pseudo_client_op into wrapper
* Eliminate dependency on PATH_MAX.
* Related cleanup, such as tracking CWD better, and using
the tracked value for getcwd().
spotting these.) Check for failed calls to pseudo_prefix_path in
a couple of places, handle failed open of pid file, and make
pseudo_prefix_path robust in the case of a zero-length PSEUDO_PREFIX.
Also, don't try to overwrite the contents of an environment
variable anymore. (The amazing part? None of these have ever
caused a failure.)