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From 4411b523545b22022b4be7d0cac25aa170ae1d3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fei Li <lifeibiren@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 02:18:37 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when PAC is enabled
The bug was found on Windows 10 (MINGW64) when PAC is enabled. It turned
out to be the large PAC file (more than 102400 bytes) returned by a
local proxy program with no content-length present.
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libproxy/libproxy/commit/6d342b50366a048d3d543952e2be271b5742c5f8]
CVE: CVE-2020-26154
Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
libproxy/url.cpp | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libproxy/url.cpp b/libproxy/url.cpp
index ee776b2..8684086 100644
--- a/libproxy/url.cpp
+++ b/libproxy/url.cpp
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ using namespace std;
#define PAC_MIME_TYPE_FB "text/plain"
// This is the maximum pac size (to avoid memory attacks)
-#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 102400
+#define PAC_MAX_SIZE 0x800000
// This is the default block size to use when receiving via HTTP
#define PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE 512
@@ -478,15 +478,13 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
}
// Get content
- unsigned int recvd = 0;
- buffer = new char[PAC_MAX_SIZE];
- memset(buffer, 0, PAC_MAX_SIZE);
+ std::vector<char> dynamic_buffer;
do {
unsigned int chunk_length;
if (chunked) {
// Discard the empty line if we received a previous chunk
- if (recvd > 0) recvline(sock);
+ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) recvline(sock);
// Get the chunk-length line as an integer
if (sscanf(recvline(sock).c_str(), "%x", &chunk_length) != 1 || chunk_length == 0) break;
@@ -498,21 +496,41 @@ char* url::get_pac() {
if (content_length >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) break;
- while (content_length == 0 || recvd != content_length) {
- int r = recv(sock, buffer + recvd,
- content_length == 0 ? PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE
- : content_length - recvd, 0);
+ while (content_length == 0 || dynamic_buffer.size() != content_length) {
+ // Calculate length to recv
+ unsigned int length_to_read = PAC_HTTP_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (content_length > 0)
+ length_to_read = content_length - dynamic_buffer.size();
+
+ // Prepare buffer
+ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() + length_to_read);
+
+ int r = recv(sock, dynamic_buffer.data() + dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read, length_to_read, 0);
+
+ // Shrink buffer to fit
+ if (r >= 0)
+ dynamic_buffer.resize(dynamic_buffer.size() - length_to_read + r);
+
+ // PAC size too large, discard
+ if (dynamic_buffer.size() >= PAC_MAX_SIZE) {
+ chunked = false;
+ dynamic_buffer.clear();
+ break;
+ }
+
if (r <= 0) {
chunked = false;
break;
}
- recvd += r;
}
} while (chunked);
- if (content_length != 0 && string(buffer).size() != content_length) {
- delete[] buffer;
- buffer = NULL;
+ if (content_length == 0 || content_length == dynamic_buffer.size()) {
+ buffer = new char[dynamic_buffer.size() + 1];
+ if (!dynamic_buffer.empty()) {
+ memcpy(buffer, dynamic_buffer.data(), dynamic_buffer.size());
+ }
+ buffer[dynamic_buffer.size()] = '\0';
}
}
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