aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-qoriq/qoriq/0013-Fixed-DH-keygen-pair-generator.patch
blob: 12465d7efd442d9e8e3a1a0c29913aa78d8c17ca (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
From 4d5ffd41f423309fc9aaf3621598ca51c5838e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
Date: Thu, 1 May 2014 06:35:45 +0545
Subject: [PATCH 13/48] Fixed DH keygen pair generator

Upstream-status: Pending

Wrong Padding results into keygen length error

Signed-off-by: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@freescale.com>
---
 crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
index db8e02d..4929ae6 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
@@ -3534,44 +3534,60 @@ static int cryptodev_dh_keygen_async(DH *dh, struct pkc_cookie_s *cookie)
 static int cryptodev_dh_keygen(DH *dh)
 {
     struct crypt_kop kop;
-    int ret = 1, g_len;
-    unsigned char *g = NULL;
+    int ret = 1, q_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *s = NULL, *w = NULL;
+    BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+    int generate_new_key = 1;
 
-    if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
-        if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-            goto sw_try;
-    }
+    if (dh->priv_key)
+        priv_key = dh->priv_key;
 
-    if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
-        if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
-            goto sw_try;
-    }
+    if (dh->pub_key)
+        pub_key = dh->pub_key;
 
-    g_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+    q_len = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
         /**
          * Get generator into a plain buffer. If length is less than
          * q_len then add leading padding bytes.
          */
-    if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &g_len)) {
+    if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->g, &g, &q_len)) {
+        DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto sw_try;
+    }
+
+    if (spcf_bn2bin_ex(dh->p, &q, &q_len)) {
         DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto sw_try;
     }
 
     memset(&kop, 0, sizeof kop);
     kop.crk_op = CRK_DH_GENERATE_KEY;
-    if (bn2crparam(dh->p, &kop.crk_param[0]))
-        goto sw_try;
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = q;
+    kop.crk_param[0].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
     if (!dh->q || bn2crparam(dh->q, &kop.crk_param[1]))
         goto sw_try;
     kop.crk_param[2].crp_p = g;
-    kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = g_len * 8;
+    kop.crk_param[2].crp_nbits = q_len * 8;
     kop.crk_iparams = 3;
 
+    s = OPENSSL_malloc(q_len);
+    if (!s) {
+        DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto sw_try;
+    }
+
+    w = OPENSSL_malloc(q_len);
+    if (!w) {
+        DSAerr(DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto sw_try;
+    }
+
     /* pub_key is or prime length while priv key is of length of order */
-    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dh->p), dh->pub_key,
-                       BN_num_bytes(dh->q), dh->priv_key))
+    if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, q_len, w, q_len, s))
         goto sw_try;
 
+    dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(w, q_len, pub_key);
+    dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(s, q_len, priv_key);
     return ret;
  sw_try:
     {
-- 
2.7.0