path: root/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0057-x86-bugs-Rename-_RDS-to-_SSBD.patch

From 4bb9a717246aa3019a3d97904e29c4da0bfc37f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 9 May 2018 21:41:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 57/93] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD

commit 9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream

Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).

Hence changing it.

It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.

Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.

[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   | 12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          | 14 +++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h               |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                 |  2 +-
 12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8797069..0ed8ea5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDS			(18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 7ad3ed9..0145a0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT		2	   /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO		(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
-						    * required.
+						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						    * control required.
 						    */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
index 45ef00a..dc21209 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 661afac..2d8788a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_RDS			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
+#define TIF_SSBD		5	/* Reduced data speculation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
-#define _TIF_RDS		(1 << TIF_RDS)
+#define _TIF_SSBD		(1 << TIF_SSBD)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a176c81..acb2fcc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -555,12 +555,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
-		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
 		 */
 		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
-			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -849,9 +849,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 9a3bb65..ae6f9ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
- * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  */
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 	return msrval;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
@@ -173,18 +173,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
-static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
-	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 		return mode;
 
 	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
-	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 	 */
 	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
@@ -517,12 +517,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 		 */
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
-			x86_amd_rds_enable();
+			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -555,16 +555,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
-		x86_amd_rds_enable();
+		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index beb1da8..d0dd736 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index f15aea6..047adaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
-		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 	}
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 9c48e18..c344230 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 	}
 }
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
 		cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
 		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 237e926..db95637 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
-		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(RDS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index 39dd457..72551c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
 		return true;
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
-	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_RDS)));
+	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)));
 }
 
 static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 17199dc..c7df5c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -3133,7 +3133,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			return 1;
 
 		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
-		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
+		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
 			return 1;
 
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
-- 
2.7.4