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Diffstat (limited to 'meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch117
1 files changed, 117 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fa17dc72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0080-KVM-SVM-Add-support-for-SEV-LAUNCH_SECRET-command.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From df27d409eaaf9275190905f8714ca2c1ae2c19b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2017 10:57:38 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 80/95] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region.
+
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
+Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: x86@kernel.org
+Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+index 94461e3..83a4dfe 100755
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+@@ -6503,6 +6503,71 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
++{
++ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
++ struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
++ struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
++ struct page **pages;
++ void *blob, *hdr;
++ unsigned long n;
++ int ret;
++
++ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
++ return -ENOTTY;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
++ if (!pages)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ /*
++ * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
++ * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
++ */
++ if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto e_unpin_memory;
++ }
++
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!data)
++ goto e_unpin_memory;
++
++ blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
++ if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
++ ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
++ goto e_free;
++ }
++
++ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
++ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
++
++ hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
++ if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
++ ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
++ goto e_free_blob;
++ }
++ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
++ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
++
++ data->handle = sev->handle;
++ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
++
++ kfree(hdr);
++
++e_free_blob:
++ kfree(blob);
++e_free:
++ kfree(data);
++e_unpin_memory:
++ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
++ return ret;
++}
++
+ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+ {
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
+@@ -6541,6 +6606,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+ case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
+ r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
+ break;
++ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
++ r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
++ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+--
+2.7.4
+