diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch | 85 |
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91605218 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-amd-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.14.71-e3000/0048-x86-efi-Access-EFI-data-as-encrypted-when-SEV-is-act.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 5738318ceb0dc0f9877ce766246fbae6759affd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> +Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 09:30:49 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 48/95] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is + active + +EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the +page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed +encrypted. + +Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> +Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> +Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> +Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> +Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> +Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org +Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org +Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> +Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> +Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> +Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> +Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com +Signed-off-by: Sudheesh Mavila <sudheesh.mavila@amd.com> +--- + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +index ae369c2..2833e66 100644 +--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c ++++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + #include <linux/reboot.h> + #include <linux/slab.h> + #include <linux/ucs2_string.h> ++#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> + + #include <asm/setup.h> + #include <asm/page.h> +@@ -375,7 +376,11 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages) + * as trim_bios_range() will reserve the first page and isolate it away + * from memory allocators anyway. + */ +- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, _PAGE_RW)) { ++ pf = _PAGE_RW; ++ if (sev_active()) ++ pf |= _PAGE_ENC; ++ ++ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, 0x0, 0x0, 1, pf)) { + pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the first page!\n"); + return 1; + } +@@ -418,6 +423,9 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va) + if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)) + flags |= _PAGE_PCD; + ++ if (sev_active()) ++ flags |= _PAGE_ENC; ++ + pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; + if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, va, md->num_pages, flags)) + pr_warn("Error mapping PA 0x%llx -> VA 0x%llx!\n", +@@ -544,6 +552,9 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m + if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)) + pf |= _PAGE_RW; + ++ if (sev_active()) ++ pf |= _PAGE_ENC; ++ + return efi_update_mappings(md, pf); + } + +@@ -595,6 +606,9 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void) + (md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)) + pf |= _PAGE_RW; + ++ if (sev_active()) ++ pf |= _PAGE_ENC; ++ + efi_update_mappings(md, pf); + } + } +-- +2.7.4 + |