aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch')
-rw-r--r--common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch173
1 files changed, 173 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7377d2cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0013-x86-cpufeature-Blacklist-SPEC_CTRL-PRED_CMD-on-early.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+From ba3461b1d9bf51d9719e001f3095a2f4b9b7031d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 13/42] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early
+ Spectre v2 microcodes
+
+(cherry picked from commit a5b2966364538a0e68c9fa29bc0a3a1651799035)
+
+This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to
+use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing
+the appropriate feature bits.
+
+The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have
+been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control
+of what's available.
+
+It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that
+doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18
+almost made me lose my lunch.
+
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
+Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
+Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com
+Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
+Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
+Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
+Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
+Cc: peterz@infradead.org
+Cc: bp@alien8.de
+Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
+Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
+Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
+Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 7 ++--
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+index 34a46dc..75b748a 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ */
+
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E
++
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17
+@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G 0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E
++
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F
+@@ -36,9 +38,9 @@
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46
+
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D
+-#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F
++#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56
+
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E
+@@ -57,9 +59,10 @@
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */
+-#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */
++#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Anniedale */
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C
+ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */
++#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A
+
+ /* Xeon Phi */
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+index fcd484d..4d23d78 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
++ * Information taken from;
++ * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
++ * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
++ * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
++ * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
++ */
++struct sku_microcode {
++ u8 model;
++ u8 stepping;
++ u32 microcode;
++};
++static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
++ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
++ /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */
++ { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 },
++ /* Observed in the wild */
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
++ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
++};
++
++static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
++ if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
++ c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
++ return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
++ }
++ return false;
++}
++
+ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ {
+ u64 misc_enable;
+@@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode);
+ }
+
++ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
++ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
++ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) ||
++ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) ||
++ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
++ pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n");
++ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
++ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
++ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL);
++ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD);
++ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP);
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
+ *
+--
+2.7.4
+