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authorAwais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>2018-11-14 14:44:19 +0500
committerAwais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>2018-11-14 14:44:22 +0500
commitbc139f16bfe8bc885b1505706faa9a4564c77ff2 (patch)
tree71fc44d89877e81f7b77f13db4b08980a32df2a7 /common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
parent972275e4accf161f73fab3bbc7eb24fa95356e95 (diff)
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common: drop all the 4.9 kernel metadata
None of the BSPs are currently based on the 4.9 kernel so drop the common metadata as well. Signed-off-by: Awais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch')
-rw-r--r--common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch148
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 148 deletions
diff --git a/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e6531584..00000000
--- a/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-From 891112052277801e900b37496ca8c260a5e7e7e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 09:03:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 05/12] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related
- details
-
-commit 21e433bdb95bdf3aa48226fd3d33af608437f293 upstream.
-
-Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:
-
- dmesg | grep -i spectre
-
-... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.
-
-Also fix a few other details:
-
- - clarify a comment about firmware speculation control
-
- - s/KPTI/PTI
-
- - remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier
-
-Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
-Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
-Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
-Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
-Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
-Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
-Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
-Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
-Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
-Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
-Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-index 957ad44..b83e0c9 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-@@ -161,8 +161,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
- if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
- else {
-- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
-- sizeof(arg));
-+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
- if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-
-@@ -174,8 +173,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
- }
-
- if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
-- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n",
-- mitigation_options[i].option);
-+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- }
- }
-@@ -184,8 +182,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
- cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
- !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
-- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
-- mitigation_options[i].option);
-+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- }
-
-@@ -255,14 +252,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
- goto retpoline_auto;
- break;
- }
-- pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
-+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
- return;
-
- retpoline_auto:
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
- retpoline_amd:
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-- pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
-+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
- goto retpoline_generic;
- }
- mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
-@@ -280,7 +277,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
- pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
-
- /*
-- * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
-+ * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
- * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
- * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
- * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
-@@ -294,21 +291,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
- if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-- pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-+ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- }
-
- /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
-- pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
-+ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
- }
- }
-
- #undef pr_fmt
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
-- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
-+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
- {
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-@@ -317,16 +313,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
- }
-
--ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
-- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
-+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
- {
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
- }
-
--ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
-- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
-+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
- {
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
---
-2.7.4
-