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authorAwais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>2018-04-03 16:51:01 +0500
committerAwais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>2018-04-04 10:26:39 +0500
commit78f41ac562f4686dc6db0b35c9e5d1fbbcdbc890 (patch)
treed934a4187df828110f91a54d07e22b6e145ae0ab /common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
parent1d4d2b7af6fb9d8699c27dc6bfd842f05bb12255 (diff)
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linux-yocto_4.9: move upstream backports to common layer
This moves the upstream backports to the common layer and uses an append to apply these so the same could be used for other common changes. Signed-off-by: Awais Belal <awais_belal@mentor.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch')
-rw-r--r--common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch148
1 files changed, 148 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e6531584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-4.9.21/0005-x86-speculation-Clean-up-various-Spectre-related-det.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 891112052277801e900b37496ca8c260a5e7e7e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 09:03:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/12] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related
+ details
+
+commit 21e433bdb95bdf3aa48226fd3d33af608437f293 upstream.
+
+Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:
+
+ dmesg | grep -i spectre
+
+... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.
+
+Also fix a few other details:
+
+ - clarify a comment about firmware speculation control
+
+ - s/KPTI/PTI
+
+ - remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier
+
+Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
+Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
+Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
+Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+index 957ad44..b83e0c9 100644
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+@@ -161,8 +161,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+ else {
+- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+- sizeof(arg));
++ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+@@ -174,8 +173,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n",
+- mitigation_options[i].option);
++ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+@@ -184,8 +182,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+- mitigation_options[i].option);
++ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+@@ -255,14 +252,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+ break;
+ }
+- pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
++ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return;
+
+ retpoline_auto:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ retpoline_amd:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+- pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
++ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ }
+ mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+@@ -280,7 +277,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+ /*
+- * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
++ * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
+ * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
+ * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
+ * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+@@ -294,21 +291,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+ if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+- pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
++ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+- pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
++ pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ #undef pr_fmt
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
++ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+@@ -317,16 +313,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ }
+
+-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
++ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+ }
+
+-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
++ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+--
+2.7.4
+