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2020-01-17Merge branch 'v4.18/standard/base' into v4.18/standard/tiny/arm-versatile-926ejsv4.18/standard/tiny/arm-versatile-926ejsBruce Ashfield1-1/+1
2020-01-17linux-yocto linux-yocto-dev: Fix /bin/awk issuesv4.18/standard/tiny/intelv4.18/standard/tiny/common-pcv4.18/standard/tiny/basev4.18/standard/qemuppcv4.18/standard/qemuarm64v4.18/standard/intel-x86v4.18/standard/intelv4.18/standard/edgerouterv4.18/standard/beaglebonev4.18/standard/baseHe Zhe1-1/+1
084857b1bf19 ("linux-yocto: Handle /bin/awk issues") makes one mistake and misses one substitution causing the following warning. Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk' Fixes: 084857b1bf19 ("linux-yocto: Handle /bin/awk issues") Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Bruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@gmail.com>
2019-09-23Merge branch 'v4.18/standard/base' into v4.18/standard/tiny/arm-versatile-926ejsBruce Ashfield16-84/+993
2019-09-23Merge tag 'v4.18.45' into v4.18/standard/baseBruce Ashfield16-84/+993
This is the 4.18.45 stable release # gpg: Signature made Sat 21 Sep 2019 12:20:15 PM EDT # gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6 # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2019-09-23Merge branch 'v4.18/standard/base' into v4.18/standard/tiny/arm-versatile-926ejsBruce Ashfield246-713/+1522
2019-09-23Merge tag 'v4.18.44' into v4.18/standard/baseBruce Ashfield246-713/+1522
This is the 4.18.44 stable release # gpg: Signature made Tue 17 Sep 2019 10:35:59 AM EDT # gpg: using RSA key EBCE84042C07D1D6 # gpg: Can't check signature: No public key
2019-09-21Linux 4.18.45v4.18.45Paul Gortmaker1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21powerpc/tm: Fix restoring FP/VMX facility incorrectly on interruptsGustavo Romero1-16/+2
commit a8318c13e79badb92bc6640704a64cc022a6eb97 upstream. When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process. Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state. The process looks like this: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne Hardware interrupt ---- > <do_IRQ...> .... ret_from_except restore_math() /* sees FP=0 */ restore_fp() tm_active_with_fp() /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */ load_fp_state() FP = 0 -> 1 < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1. The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp(). tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored. This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. Similarly for VMX. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c This fixes CVE-2019-15031. Fixes: a7771176b439 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transactionGustavo Romero1-1/+2
commit 8205d5d98ef7f155de211f5e2eb6ca03d95a5a60 upstream. When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current FP registers to the checkpointed ones. This copy is done in tm_reclaim_thread(). We use thread->ckpt_regs.msr to determine if FP was on when in userspace. thread->ckpt_regs.msr represents the state of the MSR when exiting userspace. This is setup by check_if_tm_restore_required(). Unfortunatley there is an optimisation in giveup_all() which returns early if tsk->thread.regs->msr (via local variable `usermsr`) has FP=VEC=VSX=SPE=0. This optimisation means that check_if_tm_restore_required() is not called and hence thread->ckpt_regs.msr is not updated and will contain an old value. This can happen if due to load_fp=255 we start a userspace process with MSR FP=1 and then we are context switched out. In this case thread->ckpt_regs.msr will contain FP=1. If that same process is then context switched in and load_fp overflows, MSR will have FP=0. If that process now enters a transaction and does an FP instruction, the FP unavailable will not update thread->ckpt_regs.msr (the bug) and MSR FP=1 will be retained in thread->ckpt_regs.msr. tm_reclaim_thread() will then not perform the required memcpy and the checkpointed FP regs in the thread struct will contain the wrong values. The code path for this happening is: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP/VEC/VSX/SPE=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne fp instruction FP unavailable ---- > fp_unavailable_tm() tm_reclaim_current() tm_reclaim_thread() giveup_all() return early since FP/VMX/VSX=0 /* ckpt MSR not updated (Incorrect) */ tm_reclaim() /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs contain junk (OK) */ /* Sees ckpt MSR FP=1 (Incorrect) */ no memcpy() performed /* thread_struct ckpt FP regs not fixed (Incorrect) */ tm_recheckpoint() /* Put junk in hardware checkpoint FP regs */ .... < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. This patch moves up check_if_tm_restore_required() in giveup_all() to ensure thread->ckpt_regs.msr is updated correctly. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c Similarly for VMX. This fixes CVE-2019-15030. Fixes: f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+ Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-1-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21tools arch x86: Sync asm/cpufeatures.h with the with the kernelArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-0/+3
commit 0ac10d87a571ae7d68c7f70f1c2229388f1dce9e upstream. To pick up the changes in: f36cf386e3fe ("x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGS") 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations") That don't affect anything in tools/. This silences this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-860dq1qie2cpnfghlpcnxrzr@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21tools arch x86: Sync asm/cpufeatures.h with the with the kernelArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-0/+3
commit b979540a7522617e190636621e7c5ffae469f8f0 upstream. To pick up the changes in: ed5194c2732c ("x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS") e261f209c366 ("x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY") That don't affect anything in tools/. This silences this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Luis Cláudio Gonçalves <lclaudio@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-jp1afecx3ql1jkuirpgkqfad@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentationJosh Poimboeuf1-8/+80
commit 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac upstream. Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of Spectre v1. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude ATOMs from speculation through SWAPGSThomas Gleixner3-29/+32
commit f36cf386e3fec258a341d446915862eded3e13d8 upstream. Intel provided the following information: On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a speculatively written segment value. That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled. Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> [PG: drop HYGON chunk - doesn't exist in 4.18.x kernels.] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/entry/64: Use JMP instead of JMPQJosh Poimboeuf1-1/+1
commit 64dbc122b20f75183d8822618c24f85144a5a94d upstream. Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot. Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended. Fixes: 18ec54fdd6d1 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigationsJosh Poimboeuf2-13/+110
commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream. The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are enabled. Enable those features where applicable. The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off". There are different features which can affect the risk of attack: - When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI handler: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1 // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg // for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2 If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak. Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based accesses. NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case doesn't exist quite yet. - When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address needs to be read from user space first. Something like: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1 mov (%reg1), %reg2 // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2 // for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3 It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable. Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case: - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector. - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome. Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function. Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs is serializing on AMD. [ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested by Dave Hansen ] Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigationsJosh Poimboeuf3-3/+37
commit 18ec54fdd6d18d92025af097cd042a75cf0ea24c upstream. Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user GS. For example: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg mov (%reg), %reg1 When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel attack. A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest of the speculative window. The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except: a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset) isn't user-controlled; and b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described above). The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the lfences can be skipped in those cases. On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI. To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate features for alternative patching: X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed. The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/cpufeatures: Combine word 11 and 12 into a new scattered features wordFenghua Yu6-34/+34
commit acec0ce081de0c36459eea91647faf99296445a3 upstream. It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be added in word 11 in the future. Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a Linux-defined leaf. Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12. Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the code into a separate function. KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM. Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21x86/cpufeatures: Carve out CQM features retrievalBorislav Petkov1-27/+33
commit 45fc56e629caa451467e7664fbd4c797c434a6c4 upstream. ... into a separate function for better readability. Split out from a patch from Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> to keep the mechanical, sole code movement separate for easy review. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for SpectreTim Chen3-0/+700
commit 6e88559470f581741bcd0f2794f9054814ac9740 upstream. Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-21Documentation: Add nospectre_v1 parameterDiana Craciun1-0/+4
commit 26cb1f36c43ee6e89d2a9f48a5a7500d5248f836 upstream. Currently only supported on powerpc. Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16Linux 4.18.44v4.18.44Paul Gortmaker1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for realThomas Gleixner1-5/+10
commit 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 upstream. A recent change moved the microcode loader hotplug callback into the early startup phase which is running with interrupts disabled. It missed that the callbacks invoke sysfs functions which might sleep causing nice 'might sleep' splats with proper debugging enabled. Split the callbacks and only load the microcode in the early startup phase and move the sysfs handling back into the later threaded and preemptible bringup phase where it was before. Fixes: 78f4e932f776 ("x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906182228350.1766@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
2019-09-16timekeeping: Use proper ktime_add when adding nsecs in coarse offsetJason A. Donenfeld1-1/+1
commit 0354c1a3cdf31f44b035cfad14d32282e815a572 upstream. While this doesn't actually amount to a real difference, since the macro evaluates to the same thing, every place else operates on ktime_t using these functions, so let's not break the pattern. Fixes: e3ff9c3678b4 ("timekeeping: Repair ktime_get_coarse*() granularity") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190621203249.3909-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
2019-09-16selftests: fib_rule_tests: use pre-defined DEV_ADDRHangbin Liu1-2/+3
commit 34632975cafdd07ce80e85c2eda4e9c16b5f2faa upstream. DEV_ADDR is defined but not used. Use it in address setting. Do the same with IPv6 for consistency. Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Fixes: fc82d93e57e3 ("selftests: fib_rule_tests: fix local IPv4 address typo") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-09-16ipvs: defer hook registration to avoid leaksJulian Anastasov1-7/+14
commit cf47a0b882a4e5f6b34c7949d7b293e9287f1972 upstream. syzkaller reports for memory leak when registering hooks [1] As we moved the nf_unregister_net_hooks() call into __ip_vs_dev_cleanup(), defer the nf_register_net_hooks() call, so that hooks are allocated and freed from same pernet_operations (ipvs_core_dev_ops). [1] BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88810acd8a80 (size 96): comm "syz-executor073", pid 7254, jiffies 4294950560 (age 22.250s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 8b bb 82 ff ff ff ff ........P....... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 77 bb 82 ff ff ff ff .........w...... backtrace: [<0000000013db61f1>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55 [inline] [<0000000013db61f1>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline] [<0000000013db61f1>] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3269 [inline] [<0000000013db61f1>] kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x15b/0x2a0 mm/slab.c:3597 [<000000001a27307d>] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3619 [inline] [<000000001a27307d>] __kmalloc_node+0x38/0x50 mm/slab.c:3627 [<0000000025054add>] kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline] [<0000000025054add>] kvmalloc_node+0x4a/0xd0 mm/util.c:431 [<0000000050d1bc00>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:637 [inline] [<0000000050d1bc00>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:645 [inline] [<0000000050d1bc00>] allocate_hook_entries_size+0x3b/0x60 net/netfilter/core.c:61 [<00000000e8abe142>] nf_hook_entries_grow+0xae/0x270 net/netfilter/core.c:128 [<000000004b94797c>] __nf_register_net_hook+0x9a/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:337 [<00000000d1545cbc>] nf_register_net_hook+0x34/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:464 [<00000000876c9b55>] nf_register_net_hooks+0x53/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:480 [<000000002ea868e0>] __ip_vs_init+0xe8/0x170 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c:2280 [<000000002eb2d451>] ops_init+0x4c/0x140 net/core/net_namespace.c:130 [<000000000284ec48>] setup_net+0xde/0x230 net/core/net_namespace.c:316 [<00000000a70600fa>] copy_net_ns+0xf0/0x1e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:439 [<00000000ff26c15e>] create_new_namespaces+0x141/0x2a0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107 [<00000000b103dc79>] copy_namespaces+0xa1/0xe0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165 [<000000007cc008a2>] copy_process.part.0+0x11fd/0x2150 kernel/fork.c:2035 [<00000000c344af7c>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1800 [inline] [<00000000c344af7c>] _do_fork+0x121/0x4f0 kernel/fork.c:2369 Reported-by: syzbot+722da59ccb264bc19910@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 719c7d563c17 ("ipvs: Fix use-after-free in ip_vs_in") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2019-09-16initramfs: don't free a non-existent initrdSteven Price1-2/+2
commit 5d59aa8f9ce972b472201aed86e904bb75879ff0 upstream. Since commit 54c7a8916a88 ("initramfs: free initrd memory if opening /initrd.image fails"), the kernel has unconditionally attempted to free the initrd even if it doesn't exist. In the non-existent case this causes a boot-time splat if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is enabled due to a call to virt_to_phys() with a NULL address. Instead we should check that the initrd actually exists and only attempt to free it if it does. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190516143125.48948-1-steven.price@arm.com Fixes: 54c7a8916a88 ("initramfs: free initrd memory if opening /initrd.image fails") Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [PG: adapt for older 4.18.x codebase with kexec if/else chunk.] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16x86/ftrace: Fix warning and considate ftrace_jmp_replace() and ↵Steven Rostedt (VMware)1-25/+17
ftrace_call_replace() commit 745cfeaac09ce359130a5451d90cb0bd4094c290 upstream. Arnd reported the following compiler warning: arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c:669:23: error: 'ftrace_jmp_replace' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-function] The ftrace_jmp_replace() function now only has a single user and should be simply moved by that user. But looking at the code, it shows that ftrace_jmp_replace() is similar to ftrace_call_replace() except that instead of using the opcode of 0xe8 it uses 0xe9. It makes more sense to consolidate that function into one implementation that both ftrace_jmp_replace() and ftrace_call_replace() use by passing in the op code separate. The structure in ftrace_code_union is also modified to replace the "e8" field with the more appropriate name "op". Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190304200748.1418790-1-arnd@arndb.de Fixes: d2a68c4effd8 ("x86/ftrace: Do not call function graph from dynamic trampolines") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16MIPS: Fix bounds check virt_addr_validHauke Mehrtens1-1/+1
commit d6ed083f5cc621e15c15b56c3b585fd524dbcb0f upstream. The bounds check used the uninitialized variable vaddr, it should use the given parameter kaddr instead. When using the uninitialized value the compiler assumed it to be 0 and optimized this function to just return 0 in all cases. This should make the function check the range of the given address and only do the page map check in case it is in the expected range of virtual addresses. Fixes: 074a1e1167af ("MIPS: Bounds check virt_addr_valid") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: jhogan@kernel.org Cc: f4bug@amsat.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: ysu@wavecomp.com Cc: jcristau@debian.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16drm/nouveau/i2c: Enable i2c pads & busses during preinitLyude Paul1-0/+20
commit 7cb95eeea6706c790571042a06782e378b2561ea upstream. It turns out that while disabling i2c bus access from software when the GPU is suspended was a step in the right direction with: commit 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after ->fini()") We also ended up accidentally breaking the vbios init scripts on some older Tesla GPUs, as apparently said scripts can actually use the i2c bus. Since these scripts are executed before initializing any subdevices, we end up failing to acquire access to the i2c bus which has left a number of cards with their fan controllers uninitialized. Luckily this doesn't break hardware - it just means the fan gets stuck at 100%. This also means that we've always been using our i2c busses before initializing them during the init scripts for older GPUs, we just didn't notice it until we started preventing them from being used until init. It's pretty impressive this never caused us any issues before! So, fix this by initializing our i2c pad and busses during subdev pre-init. We skip initializing aux busses during pre-init, as those are guaranteed to only ever be used by nouveau for DP aux transactions. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marc Meledandri <m.meledandri@gmail.com> Fixes: 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after ->fini()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16drm/nouveau: Don't retry infinitely when receiving no data on i2c over AUXLyude Paul1-7/+17
commit c358ebf59634f06d8ed176da651ec150df3c8686 upstream. While I had thought I had fixed this issue in: commit 342406e4fbba ("drm/nouveau/i2c: Disable i2c bus access after ->fini()") It turns out that while I did fix the error messages I was seeing on my P50 when trying to access i2c busses with the GPU in runtime suspend, I accidentally had missed one important detail that was mentioned on the bug report this commit was supposed to fix: that the CPU would only lock up when trying to access i2c busses _on connected devices_ _while the GPU is not in runtime suspend_. Whoops. That definitely explains why I was not able to get my machine to hang with i2c bus interactions until now, as plugging my P50 into it's dock with an HDMI monitor connected allowed me to finally reproduce this locally. Now that I have managed to reproduce this issue properly, it looks like the problem is much simpler then it looks. It turns out that some connected devices, such as MST laptop docks, will actually ACK i2c reads even if no data was actually read: [ 275.063043] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: 1: 0000004c 1 [ 275.063447] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: 00 01101000 10040000 [ 275.063759] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000001 [ 275.064024] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000 [ 275.064285] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000 [ 275.064594] nouveau 0000:01:00.0: i2c: aux 000a: rd 00000000 Because we don't handle the situation of i2c ack without any data, we end up entering an infinite loop in nvkm_i2c_aux_i2c_xfer() since the value of cnt always remains at 0. This finally properly explains how this could result in a CPU hang like the ones observed in the aforementioned commit. So, fix this by retrying transactions if no data is written or received, and give up and fail the transaction if we continue to not write or receive any data after 32 retries. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16net/mlx5: Avoid reloading already removed devicesAlaa Hleihel1-2/+23
commit dd80857bf388abd0c64dd3aa4fbf7d407deba819 upstream. Prior to reloading a device we must first verify that it was not already removed. Otherwise, the attempt to remove the device will do nothing, and in that case we will end up proceeding with adding an new device that no one was expecting to remove, leaving behind used resources such as EQs that causes a failure to destroy comp EQs and syndrome (0x30f433). Fix that by making sure that we try to remove and add a device (based on a protocol) only if the device is already added. Fixes: c5447c70594b ("net/mlx5: E-Switch, Reload IB interface when switching devlink modes") Signed-off-by: Alaa Hleihel <alaa@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16Abort file_remove_privs() for non-reg. filesAlexander Lochmann1-2/+7
commit f69e749a49353d96af1a293f56b5b56de59c668a upstream. file_remove_privs() might be called for non-regular files, e.g. blkdev inode. There is no reason to do its job on things like blkdev inodes, pipes, or cdevs. Hence, abort if file does not refer to a regular inode. AV: more to the point, for devices there might be any number of inodes refering to given device. Which one to strip the permissions from, even if that made any sense in the first place? All of them will be observed with contents modified, after all. Found by LockDoc (Alexander Lochmann, Horst Schirmeier and Olaf Spinczyk) Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Alexander Lochmann <alexander.lochmann@tu-dortmund.de> Signed-off-by: Horst Schirmeier <horst.schirmeier@tu-dortmund.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16coredump: fix race condition between collapse_huge_page() and core dumpingAndrea Arcangeli2-0/+7
commit 59ea6d06cfa9247b586a695c21f94afa7183af74 upstream. When fixing the race conditions between the coredump and the mmap_sem holders outside the context of the process, we focused on mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() callers in 04f5866e41fb70 ("coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping"), but those aren't the only cases where the mmap_sem can be taken outside of the context of the process as Michal Hocko noticed while backporting that commit to older -stable kernels. If mmgrab() is called in the context of the process, but then the mm_count reference is transferred outside the context of the process, that can also be a problem if the mmap_sem has to be taken for writing through that mm_count reference. khugepaged registration calls mmgrab() in the context of the process, but the mmap_sem for writing is taken later in the context of the khugepaged kernel thread. collapse_huge_page() after taking the mmap_sem for writing doesn't modify any vma, so it's not obvious that it could cause a problem to the coredump, but it happens to modify the pmd in a way that breaks an invariant that pmd_trans_huge_lock() relies upon. collapse_huge_page() needs the mmap_sem for writing just to block concurrent page faults that call pmd_trans_huge_lock(). Specifically the invariant that "!pmd_trans_huge()" cannot become a "pmd_trans_huge()" doesn't hold while collapse_huge_page() runs. The coredump will call __get_user_pages() without mmap_sem for reading, which eventually can invoke a lockless page fault which will need a functional pmd_trans_huge_lock(). So collapse_huge_page() needs to use mmget_still_valid() to check it's not running concurrently with the coredump... as long as the coredump can invoke page faults without holding the mmap_sem for reading. This has "Fixes: khugepaged" to facilitate backporting, but in my view it's more a bug in the coredump code that will eventually have to be rewritten to stop invoking page faults without the mmap_sem for reading. So the long term plan is still to drop all mmget_still_valid(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190607161558.32104-1-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: ba76149f47d8 ("thp: khugepaged") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16ocfs2: fix error path kobject memory leakTobin C. Harding1-0/+1
commit b9fba67b3806e21b98bd5a98dc3921a8e9b42d61 upstream. If a call to kobject_init_and_add() fails we should call kobject_put() otherwise we leak memory. Add call to kobject_put() in the error path of call to kobject_init_and_add(). Please note, this has the side effect that the release method is called if kobject_init_and_add() fails. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190513033458.2824-1-tobin@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16mlxsw: spectrum: Prevent force of 56GAmit Cohen1-0/+4
commit 275e928f19117d22f6d26dee94548baf4041b773 upstream. Force of 56G is not supported by hardware in Ethernet devices. This configuration fails with a bad parameter error from firmware. Add check of this case. Instead of trying to set 56G with autoneg off, return a meaningful error. Fixes: 56ade8fe3fe1 ("mlxsw: spectrum: Add initial support for Spectrum ASIC") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amitc@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16scsi: libsas: delete sas port if expander discover failedJason Yan1-0/+2
commit 3b0541791453fbe7f42867e310e0c9eb6295364d upstream. The sas_port(phy->port) allocated in sas_ex_discover_expander() will not be deleted when the expander failed to discover. This will cause resource leak and a further issue of kernel BUG like below: [159785.843156] port-2:17:29: trying to add phy phy-2:17:29 fails: it's already part of another port [159785.852144] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [159785.856833] kernel BUG at drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_sas.c:1086! [159785.863000] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP [159785.867866] CPU: 39 PID: 16993 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.19.25-vhulk1901.1.0.h111.aarch64 #1 [159785.878458] Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Hi1620EVBCS/Hi1620EVBCS, BIOS Hi1620 CS B070 1P TA 03/21/2019 [159785.889231] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_disco_q sas_discover_domain [159785.895224] pstate: 40c00009 (nZcv daif +PAN +UAO) [159785.900094] pc : sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8 [159785.904524] lr : sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8 [159785.908952] sp : ffff0001120e3b80 [159785.912341] x29: ffff0001120e3b80 x28: 0000000000000000 [159785.917727] x27: ffff802ade8f5400 x26: ffff0000681b7560 [159785.923111] x25: ffff802adf11a800 x24: ffff0000680e8000 [159785.928496] x23: ffff802ade8f5728 x22: ffff802ade8f5708 [159785.933880] x21: ffff802adea2db40 x20: ffff802ade8f5400 [159785.939264] x19: ffff802adea2d800 x18: 0000000000000010 [159785.944649] x17: 00000000821bf734 x16: ffff00006714faa0 [159785.950033] x15: ffff0000e8ab4ecf x14: 7261702079646165 [159785.955417] x13: 726c612073277469 x12: ffff00006887b830 [159785.960802] x11: ffff00006773eaa0 x10: 7968702079687020 [159785.966186] x9 : 0000000000002453 x8 : 726f702072656874 [159785.971570] x7 : 6f6e6120666f2074 x6 : ffff802bcfb21290 [159785.976955] x5 : ffff802bcfb21290 x4 : 0000000000000000 [159785.982339] x3 : ffff802bcfb298c8 x2 : 337752b234c2ab00 [159785.987723] x1 : 337752b234c2ab00 x0 : 0000000000000000 [159785.993108] Process kworker/u96:2 (pid: 16993, stack limit = 0x0000000072dae094) [159786.000576] Call trace: [159786.003097] sas_port_add_phy+0x188/0x1b8 [159786.007179] sas_ex_get_linkrate.isra.5+0x134/0x140 [159786.012130] sas_ex_discover_expander+0x128/0x408 [159786.016906] sas_ex_discover_dev+0x218/0x4c8 [159786.021249] sas_ex_discover_devices+0x9c/0x1a8 [159786.025852] sas_discover_root_expander+0x134/0x160 [159786.030802] sas_discover_domain+0x1b8/0x1e8 [159786.035148] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x3f8 [159786.039230] worker_thread+0x54/0x470 [159786.042967] kthread+0x134/0x138 [159786.046269] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [159786.049918] Code: 91322300 f0004402 91178042 97fe4c9b (d4210000) [159786.056083] Modules linked in: hns3_enet_ut(OE) hclge(OE) hnae3(OE) hisi_sas_test_hw(OE) hisi_sas_test_main(OE) serdes(OE) [159786.067202] ---[ end trace 03622b9e2d99e196 ]--- [159786.071893] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [159786.077190] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [159786.081192] Kernel Offset: disabled [159786.084753] CPU features: 0x2,a2a00a38 Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver") Reported-by: Jian Luo <luojian5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Fix possible null-ptr-derefYueHaibing1-4/+2
commit 12e750bc62044de096ab9a95201213fd912b9994 upstream. If alloc_workqueue fails in alua_init, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise it will trigger null-ptr-deref while unloading module which calls destroy_workqueue dereference wq->lock like this: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000080 by task syz-executor.0/7045 CPU: 0 PID: 7045 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0+ #28 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e __kasan_report+0x171/0x18d ? __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x6b4/0x1ee0 lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1b0 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xb90 drain_workqueue+0x25/0x290 destroy_workqueue+0x1f/0x3f0 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x244/0x330 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Fixes: 03197b61c5ec ("scsi_dh_alua: Use workqueue for RTPG") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16scsi: smartpqi: properly set both the DMA mask and the coherent DMA maskLianbo Jiang1-1/+1
commit 1d94f06e7f5df4064ef336b7b710f50143b64a53 upstream. When SME is enabled, the smartpqi driver won't work on the HP DL385 G10 machine, which causes the failure of kernel boot because it fails to allocate pqi error buffer. Please refer to the kernel log: .... [ 9.431749] usbcore: registered new interface driver uas [ 9.441524] Microsemi PQI Driver (v1.1.4-130) [ 9.442956] i40e 0000:04:00.0: fw 6.70.48768 api 1.7 nvm 10.2.5 [ 9.447237] smartpqi 0000:23:00.0: Microsemi Smart Family Controller found Starting dracut initqueue hook... [ OK ] Started Show Plymouth Boot Scre[ 9.471654] Broadcom NetXtreme-C/E driver bnxt_en v1.9.1 en. [ OK ] Started Forward Password Requests to Plymouth Directory Watch. [[0;[ 9.487108] smartpqi 0000:23:00.0: failed to allocate PQI error buffer .... [ 139.050544] dracut-initqueue[949]: Warning: dracut-initqueue timeout - starting timeout scripts [ 139.589779] dracut-initqueue[949]: Warning: dracut-initqueue timeout - starting timeout scripts Basically, the fact that the coherent DMA mask value wasn't set caused the driver to fall back to SWIOTLB when SME is active. For correct operation, lets call the dma_set_mask_and_coherent() to properly set the mask for both streaming and coherent, in order to inform the kernel about the devices DMA addressing capabilities. Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com> Tested-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16scsi: libcxgbi: add a check for NULL pointer in cxgbi_check_route()Varun Prakash1-0/+4
commit cc555759117e8349088e0c5d19f2f2a500bafdbd upstream. ip_dev_find() can return NULL so add a check for NULL pointer. Signed-off-by: Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16net: phy: dp83867: Set up RGMII TX delayMax Uvarov1-3/+1
commit 2b892649254fec01678c64f16427622b41fa27f4 upstream. PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_RGMII_RXID is less then TXID so code to set tx delay is never called. Fixes: 2a10154abcb75 ("net: phy: dp83867: Add TI dp83867 phy") Signed-off-by: Max Uvarov <muvarov@gmail.com> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16net: phylink: ensure consistent phy interface modeRussell King1-3/+7
commit c678726305b9425454be7c8a7624290b602602fc upstream. Ensure that we supply the same phy interface mode to mac_link_down() as we did for the corresponding mac_link_up() call. This ensures that MAC drivers that use the phy interface mode in these methods can depend on mac_link_down() always corresponding to a mac_link_up() call for the same interface mode. Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16net: sh_eth: fix mdio access in sh_eth_close() for R-Car Gen2 and RZ/A1 SoCsYoshihiro Shimoda1-0/+4
commit 315ca92dd863fecbffc0bb52ae0ac11e0398726a upstream. The sh_eth_close() resets the MAC and then calls phy_stop() so that mdio read access result is incorrect without any error according to kernel trace like below: ifconfig-216 [003] .n.. 109.133124: mdio_access: ee700000.ethernet-ffffffff read phy:0x01 reg:0x00 val:0xffff According to the hardware manual, the RMII mode should be set to 1 before operation the Ethernet MAC. However, the previous code was not set to 1 after the driver issued the soft_reset in sh_eth_dev_exit() so that the mdio read access result seemed incorrect. To fix the issue, this patch adds a condition and set the RMII mode register in sh_eth_dev_exit() for R-Car Gen2 and RZ/A1 SoCs. Note that when I have tried to move the sh_eth_dev_exit() calling after phy_stop() on sh_eth_close(), but it gets worse (kernel panic happened and it seems that a register is accessed while the clock is off). Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't take kvm->lock around kvm_for_each_vcpuPaul Mackerras1-8/+1
commit 5a3f49364c3ffa1107bd88f8292406e98c5d206c upstream. Currently the HV KVM code takes the kvm->lock around calls to kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() (which can call kvm_for_each_vcpu() internally). However, that leads to a lock order inversion problem, because these are called in contexts where the vcpu mutex is held, but the vcpu mutexes nest within kvm->lock according to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt. Hence there is a possibility of deadlock. To fix this, we simply don't take the kvm->lock mutex around these calls. This is safe because the implementations of kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() have been designed to be able to be called locklessly. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16KVM: PPC: Book3S: Use new mutex to synchronize access to rtas token listPaul Mackerras3-8/+8
commit 1659e27d2bc1ef47b6d031abe01b467f18cb72d9 upstream. Currently the Book 3S KVM code uses kvm->lock to synchronize access to the kvm->arch.rtas_tokens list. Because this list is scanned inside kvmppc_rtas_hcall(), which is called with the vcpu mutex held, taking kvm->lock cause a lock inversion problem, which could lead to a deadlock. To fix this, we add a new mutex, kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock, which nests inside the vcpu mutexes, and use that instead of kvm->lock when accessing the rtas token list. This removes the lockdep_assert_held() in kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free(). At this point we don't hold the new mutex, but that is OK because kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free() is only called when the whole VM is being destroyed, and at that point nothing can be looking up a token in the list. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16xenbus: Avoid deadlock during suspend due to open transactionsRoss Lagerwall3-2/+26
commit d10e0cc113c9e1b64b5c6e3db37b5c839794f3df upstream. During a suspend/resume, the xenwatch thread waits for all outstanding xenstore requests and transactions to complete. This does not work correctly for transactions started by userspace because it waits for them to complete after freezing userspace threads which means the transactions have no way of completing, resulting in a deadlock. This is trivial to reproduce by running this script and then suspending the VM: import pyxs, time c = pyxs.client.Client(xen_bus_path="/dev/xen/xenbus") c.connect() c.transaction() time.sleep(3600) Even if this deadlock were resolved, misbehaving userspace should not prevent a VM from being migrated. So, instead of waiting for these transactions to complete before suspending, store the current generation id for each transaction when it is started. The global generation id is incremented during resume. If the caller commits the transaction and the generation id does not match the current generation id, return EAGAIN so that they try again. If the transaction was instead discarded, return OK since no changes were made anyway. This only affects users of the xenbus file interface. In-kernel users of xenbus are assumed to be well-behaved and complete all transactions before freezing. Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16xen/pvcalls: Remove set but not used variableYueHaibing1-4/+0
commit 41349672e3cbc2e8349831f21253509c3415aa2b upstream. Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning: drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_sendmsg: drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:543:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c: In function pvcalls_front_recvmsg: drivers/xen/pvcalls-front.c:638:25: warning: variable bedata set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] They are never used since introduction. Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16ia64: fix build errors by exporting paddr_to_nid()Randy Dunlap1-0/+1
commit 9a626c4a6326da4433a0d4d4a8a7d1571caf1ed3 upstream. Fix build errors on ia64 when DISCONTIGMEM=y and NUMA=y by exporting paddr_to_nid(). Fixes these build errors: ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [sound/core/snd-pcm.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [net/sunrpc/sunrpc.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [fs/cifs/cifs.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/mon/usbmon.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/usb/core/usbcore.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/raid1.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-mod.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-crypt.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/md/dm-bufio.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-core.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/ide/ide-cd_mod.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/gpu/drm/drm.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/char/agp/agpgart.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/nbd.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/loop.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [drivers/block/brd.ko] undefined! ERROR: "paddr_to_nid" [crypto/ccm.ko] undefined! Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16perf record: Fix s390 missing module symbol and warning for non-root usersThomas Richter1-3/+6
commit 6738028dd57df064b969d8392c943ef3b3ae705d upstream. Command 'perf record' and 'perf report' on a system without kernel debuginfo packages uses /proc/kallsyms and /proc/modules to find addresses for kernel and module symbols. On x86 this works for root and non-root users. On s390, when invoked as non-root user, many of the following warnings are shown and module symbols are missing: proc/{kallsyms,modules} inconsistency while looking for "[sha1_s390]" module! Command 'perf record' creates a list of module start addresses by parsing the output of /proc/modules and creates a PERF_RECORD_MMAP record for the kernel and each module. The following function call sequence is executed: machine__create_kernel_maps machine__create_module modules__parse machine__create_module --> for each line in /proc/modules arch__fix_module_text_start Function arch__fix_module_text_start() is s390 specific. It opens file /sys/module/<name>/sections/.text to extract the module's .text section start address. On s390 the module loader prepends a header before the first section, whereas on x86 the module's text section address is identical the the module's load address. However module section files are root readable only. For non-root the read operation fails and machine__create_module() returns an error. Command perf record does not generate any PERF_RECORD_MMAP record for loaded modules. Later command perf report complains about missing module maps. To fix this function arch__fix_module_text_start() always returns success. For root users there is no change, for non-root users the module's load address is used as module's text start address (the prepended header then counts as part of the text section). This enable non-root users to use module symbols and avoid the warning when perf report is executed. Output before: [tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP 0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text Output after: [tmricht@m83lp54 perf]$ ./perf report -D | fgrep MMAP 0 0x168 [0x50]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x [kernel.kallsyms]_text 0 0x1b8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../autofs4.ko.xz 0 0x250 [0xa8]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../sha_common.ko.xz 0 0x2f8 [0x98]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP ... x /lib/modules/.../des_generic.ko.xz Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522144601.50763-4-tmricht@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16perf namespace: Protect reading thread's namespaceNamhyung Kim1-2/+13
commit 6584140ba9e6762dd7ec73795243289b914f31f9 upstream. It seems that the current code lacks holding the namespace lock in thread__namespaces(). Otherwise it can see inconsistent results. Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522053250.207156-2-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2019-09-16perf data: Fix 'strncat may truncate' build failure with recent gccShawn Landden1-1/+1
commit 97acec7df172cd1e450f81f5e293c0aa145a2797 upstream. This strncat() is safe because the buffer was allocated with zalloc(), however gcc doesn't know that. Since the string always has 4 non-null bytes, just use memcpy() here. CC /home/shawn/linux/tools/perf/util/data-convert-bt.o In file included from /usr/include/string.h:494, from /home/shawn/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.h:27, from util/data-convert-bt.c:22: In function ‘strncat’, inlined from ‘string_set_value’ at util/data-convert-bt.c:274:4: /usr/include/powerpc64le-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:136:10: error: ‘__builtin_strncat’ output may be truncated copying 4 bytes from a string of length 4 [-Werror=stringop-truncation] 136 | return __builtin___strncat_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest)); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> LPU-Reference: 20190518183238.10954-1-shawn@git.icu Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-289f1jice17ta7tr3tstm9jm@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>